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ABSTRACT 
Small businesses significantly rely on debt financing. However, it is challenging for 
them to convince the lenders on their creditworthiness because of the agency problems 
rooted in information asymmetry. Professionalization, as one of the signal devices, may 
carry positive information about a small firm since it helps enhance the firm value by 
aligning owner and manager’s interests. If firm value goes up, the financial leverage 
drops without any new external debt financing. Thus, it is safer for the lenders to 
provide the capital. Unfortunately, whether professionalization helps mitigate the 
lender-borrower conflict of interest has not been investigated in the previous literature. 
This study intends to help fill in this gap by investigating the influence of 
professionalization on small business debt financing. Our empirical results show that 
professionalization tends to increase the use and the amount of new venture debt 
financing. Findings also indicate that the solution to owner-manager agency problem 
can also help alleviate the creditor-shareholder conflict of interests in new venture debt 
financing.  
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1. Introduction 
Small firms and new ventures make great contributions to the economy (Berger and Udell, 
1998; Cavalluzzo, Cavalluzzo, and Wolken, 2002; Dicke, 1996); however, financing 
difficulties definitely challenge small firms’ growth and innovation (Berger and Udell, 2002; 
Coleman, 2000; Zider, 1998). Berger and Udell (1998) reveal two reasons regarding the 
difficulty for small firms to obtain equity financing at their initial stages; one is the existence of 
transaction costs, the other is the information asymmetry problem because small firms are 
usually privately held. Thus, scholars (e.g., Berger and Udell, 2002; Cassar, 2004) consider 
debt financing as a major source of capital for small firms. Compared to equity financing, debt 
financing allows small firms to keep ownership control (Ueda, 2004), reduces the costs 
(Graham, 2000), and sends a signal about the firm’s quality (Ross, 1977).  
However, it is also hard for small firms and new ventures to obtain debt financing because 
they are usually young without sufficient track records. Consequently, investors cannot identify 
the creditworthiness of the firms. In short, information asymmetry causes agency problems 
between lenders and borrowers, and a good relationship with the lenders is one of the solutions 
to lower this type of the agency cost (e.g., Berger and Udell, 1995; Boot, 2000; Elyasiani and 
Goldberg, 2004; Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Besides it, the corporate finance literature suggests 
several mechanisms to mitigate the agency problems caused by information asymmetry, 
including monitoring, bonding, and signaling (Bar-Isaac, 2003; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Jensen and Smith, 1985; Shieh, 1993). Among those, signaling is one of the most effective 
approaches for alleviating the information asymmetry because it sends indirect information to 
convince the lenders about the quality of privately held firms (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Zahra 
and Filatotchev, 2004). Professionalization, as one of the signaling devices, may carry positive 
information about the small firms and new ventures since it helps enhance the firm value by 
aligning owner and manager’s interests. This view has been supported by Golembiewski (1983) 
and Newcomer (1955). If firm value goes up, the financial leverage drops without any new 
external debt financing. Thus, it is safer for the lenders to provide the capital. Unfortunately, 
whether professionalization helps mitigate the lender-borrower conflict of interest has not been 
investigated in the literature on small business and new venture financing.  
Most of the studies related to professionalization are based on the organizational theory 
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perspective (Hall, 1968; Newcomer, 1955). To the best of our knowledge, the paper by 
Hellmann and Puri (2002) is the only existing empirical study which discusses 
professionalization in the new venture finance and corporate finance literature. According to 
Hellmann and Puri (2002), venture capitalists make great contributions to the internal 
organization’s professionalization, including the introduction of “human resources policies, the 
adoption of stock option plans, and the hiring of a vice president of marketing and sales” (p. 
170). In addition, they also point out that venture-capital financed firms are also more likely to 
replace the founder with a professional outsider in the position of the company’s chief 
executive officer.  
This study intends to help fill in this gap by investigating the influence of 
professionalization on new venture debt financing. The intuition behind is that 
professionalization is viewed as a strong signal sent to the potential capital suppliers. 
According to the agency theory, this positive signal may help firm owners succeed in applying 
for financing. In this study, we use the compensation plan as a proxy for professionalization, 
and construct a dummy variable Incentive Plan to measure the adoption of compensation plan, 
whose value is one if the business offers a compensation plan in any forms among stock 
options, bonus plans, and/or paid vacation plans, and zero if the firm does not offer any of these 
compensation plans. The use of stock options is consistent with the professionalization measure 
adopted by Hellmann and Puri (2002). We also add two variables (bonus plans and paid 
vacation plans) when we create the professionalization variable because they capture the 
short-term incentives. According to a survey asking employees to choose their most desired 
benefits plan among seven options, extra paid vacation and a yearly bonus are ranked the first 
(38%) and the second (36%), respectively (Lissy, 1992). In addition, the paid vacation also 
increases the productivity, enhances the quality of employees’ life, helps achieve better health 
outcomes for individual employees, and reduces the overall health care expenditure (De Graaf, 
2009). The above arguments also imply that bonus plans and paid vacation plans are the most 
effective means to motivate employees to work hard and/or stay in the current company.  
According to the agency theory, the compensation plan as a means of incentive 
mechanisms mitigates the conflicts of interests between owners and managers. However, this 
study is to explore if the use of the compensation plan, as a proxy for professionalization, may 
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reduce the agency problems between creditors and shareholders. To broaden this research 
question, we attempt to find whether the solutions to the owner-manager conflict of interest can 
also mitigate that between creditors and shareholders because the theoretical link between these 
two different types of agency problems has not been well explored. Brau (2002) suggests no, 
while Brander and Poitevin (1992) suggest yes based on the empirical studies. In conclusion, 
the major research question of this study is: “Does professionalization help improve debt 
financing of new ventures?” 
The sample used in our study is extracted from questionnaires of the Kauffman Firm 
Survey (KFS), sponsored by the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation and conducted by the 
Mathematica Policy Research Inc. (MPR). The KFS is one of the very few surveys that track 
the performance of the U.S. new businesses over their formative period. That is, only small 
businesses founded in 2004 were selected to engage in the Baseline Survey. Following that, the 
MPR project team conducted further follow-up surveys annually to track over the same firms’ 
operation performance. Besides it, the KFS is also well known for its consistency, accuracy, 
and coverage. The data used in this study are from year 2004 (the Baseline Survey) to year 
2007 (the Third Follow-up). 4,928 businesses completed the Baseline Survey. Excluding the 
businesses that permanently out of business from the 4,928 participating businesses, the project 
team conducted three follow-ups so far to look at dynamic changes of the firms. 3,998, 3,390, 
2,915 businesses completed the interviews for the First, Second, and Third Follow-ups, 
respectively. 
Our empirical results show that professionalization tends to improve the access to and 
increase the amount of new venture debt financing. Findings also support that the solution to 
the owner-manager agency problem can also help alleviate the creditor-shareholder conflict of 
interests. This study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, it is one of the early 
studies which investigate the relationship between professionalization and debt financing of 
new ventures. Second, this study also adds to the agency theory literature by showing that the 
solution to owner-manager agency problem may also help mitigate the creditor-shareholder 
conflicts. Third, our findings also provide important implications for new ventures, potential 
investors, and researchers. New ventures that are professionalized are more likely to 
successfully raise capital through debt financing. For potential investors, understanding 
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professionalization as a signal can help them make financing decisions. This study also helps 
academics better understand the role of professionalization, which can lead to further research 
in this field.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant research related to 
our study and proposes our research question. Section 3 describes data and variables used in 
our study. The methodology, as well as the empirical models, is presented in Section 4. Section 
5 contains a discussion of the results. Section 6 gives the conclusions and limitations. 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1. Small Business Debt Financing  
Small firms make great contributions to the economy by “making up over 90% of all 
American businesses, employing nearly half of the workforce, and producing over one-third of 
America’s gross national product” (Dicke, 1996, p.11). However, financing difficulties 
definitely challenge small firms’ growth and innovation (Coleman, 2000). Generally, it is hard 
for small firms to obtain equity financing (Berger and Udell, 1998; Weinberg, 1994). On the 
one hand, according to Berger and Udell (1998), a significant amount of transaction costs, such 
as “public market due diligence, distribution, and securities registration” make small businesses 
favor private financing (p.628). They explain that substantial fixed costs by equity financing 
may create economies of scale in issue size. As there is a positive relationship between a firm’s 
issue size and asset size, it is difficult for small businesses to overcome such transaction costs. 
On the other hand, unlike larger publicly held firms that are obligated to disclose their 
information to capital market, small firms generally keep transactions private with their 
suppliers, customers, and labor force (Berger and Udell, 1998). Consequently, it is even harder 
for small firms to obtain external credit because audited financial statements are not available 
to convey the firms’ quality (Berger and Udell, 1998). 
Based on the above discussion, it is found that unlike large publicly listed companies that 
have great opportunities to finance through the equity market, low risk small business focuses 
on bank loans, trade credit, and internal financing that is provided by families, friends, or a 
start-up team (Berger and Udell, 1995; Binks and Ennew, 1996). This view is also consistent 
with the financial growth cycle perspective and the pecking order theory perspective. From the 
financial growth cycle perspective adopted by Berger and Udell (1998), a small business at its 
inception heavily depends on internal financing, trade credit, and angel investment. A 
short-term loan and venture capital may be available at the firm’s growing stage. Finally, the 
firm tends to obtain equity financing and long-term loans as it becomes larger and older. 
Consistent with the financial growth cycle perspective, the pecking order theory introduced by 
Myers (1984) states that companies rely on retained earnings when it is available, and then 
low-risk debt is preferred to equity if external financing is required. However, very high growth 
small businesses in high-tech industries often rely on venture capital for early stage financing 
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(Cumming and MacIntosh, 2004). In addition, debt financing is the major sources of capital for 
truly nascent firms since the retained earnings are insufficient or not available (Robb and 
Robinson, 2008). In general, there are two main reasons for small businesses to significantly 
depend on debt financing. First, debt financing is relatively cheap compared to equity financing 
(Graham, 2000). Second, new firms have insufficient track records, resulting in a relatively 
higher risk for capital suppliers (Berger and Udell, 1998). Therefore, shareholders are less 
likely to provide money for such firms.  
Unfortunately, the nature of small businesses results in a hard time for them to obtain debt 
financing. Small firms are usually young without sufficient track records or pledgeable 
business assets. Therefore, “a potential lender is uncertain about the competence and 
trustworthiness of the management, as well as the kinds of investment opportunities that could 
arise” (Petersen and Rajan, 1994, p.4). With all other factors controlled, the relationship lending 
helps small business get debt financing in the short run, in that it enables lenders to have more 
information about small firms (Berger and Udell, 1995; Boot, 2000; Elyasiani and Goldberg, 
2004; Petersen and Rajan, 1994). With the relationship lending, the lender makes decisions 
based on the information that is gathered “over time through contact with the firm, its owner, 
its local community”, and the borrower’s customers and suppliers (Berger and Udell, 2002, 
p.32). A bank usually charges a high interest rate and requires more collateral at the initial 
banking relationship when a borrower’s track record information is not available (Berger and 
Udell, 1995). Then a longer relationship with a bank lowers a small firm’s interest rate and 
collateral requirement on average (Berger and Udell, 1995). In summary, lending relationships 
benefit small firms from the ability of increasing the credit availability with less associated 
costs and obtaining capital even if small firms are financially distressed in the short run 
(Petersen and Rajan, 1994).  
Default risk is the leading reason why small firms significantly rely on short-term loans 
(Myers, 1977). According to Harris and Raviv (1991), in the hope of obtaining enormous 
returns, small firms tend to choose risky projects before building their reputation. In Diamond’s 
(1991) model, long-term debt financing requires a higher interest rate for bearing the long-term 
credit risk. A firm then is more likely to choose highly risky projects due to adverse selection. 
Consequently, no one is willing to provide long-term loans for those risky firms. For these 
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reasons, Diamond (1991) summarizes that very risky firms, such as a small firm, must rely on 
short-term loans. It is also worthwhile pointing out that short-term debt financing has its own 
strength. For instance, it charges a lower interest rate initially, compared to long-term loans, 
and also provides refinancing opportunities if the firm can reveal positive information later on 
(Diamond, 1991). That is, it is possible for a small firm to obtain permanent debt sources by 
continuously rolling over short-term debt claims.  
The literature has shown that relationship lending benefits small firms in terms of the 
availability of a guaranteed borrowing in the short run and the feasibility of a continuously 
renewal policy in the long run. However, relationship lending also causes agency problems 
within the lenders’ organizations. For instance, a loan officer is better informed than a bank 
about a borrower’s true situation, in that the loan officer is responsible to gather soft 
information about the firm in order to make loan decisions (Berger and Udell, 2002). In other 
words, a bank, because it has less experience with the prospective borrowers, is obviously less 
informed. Therefore, the loan officer tends to have opportunistic behavior due to the conflicts 
of interests between owners and managers (Berger and Udell, 2002). Berger and Udell (2002) 
further explain that a borrower’s unfavorable situation may be hidden by a loan officer because 
the loan officer has a personal relationship with the small firm or because the loan officer wants 
to secure his or her job.  
Akerlof (1970) is the first to address the concepts of informational asymmetry based on an 
example of the market for “lemons”. In his example, there are high quality used cars and 
“lemons” (low quality used cars) in the market. Because of the existence of asymmetrical 
information, which means that the prospective buyers are less informed about the quality of 
used cars than the sellers are, the sellers then have the incentive to sell their “lemons” at the 
prices of high quality used cars. At the same time, it is not likely for prospective buyers to 
distinguish a “lemon” from a high quality one. Thus, prospective buyers will ask for a discount 
to adjust for this lemon phenomenon. Thereafter, this unbalanced informational distribution 
discourages the prospective sellers who have high quality cars, which may lead to the existence 
of “lemons” in the market as a whole. Furthermore, markets may disappear in a situation where 
the low quality products drive out the high quality products. 
Borrowers as the better informed party tend to act immoral behaviors that take the 
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advantage of asymmetric information in the credit markets. “In a frictionless capital market, 
funds will always be available to firms with positive net present value investment opportunities” 
(Petersen and Rajan, 1994, p.3). However, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) explore that adverse 
selection and moral hazard as market frictions explain why there is insufficient capital for small 
firms to finance their profitable investment opportunities. The adverse selection problem 
increases the number of risky borrowers and reduces the bank’s overall profits, because a 
bank’s certain lending requirements tend to attract the below average prospective borrowers 
with risky projects. The moral hazard problem arises since borrowers and creditors do not have 
coincident interests. As explained by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), borrowers only concern about 
returns on the investments as long as the firms do not go bankrupt, but lenders care about the 
interest payments they will receive on the loans. Therefore, small businesses may lose 
opportunities to invest in profitable projects, because external capital suppliers cannot identify 
the projects’ quality (adverse selection problem) or they are even not sure whether the funds 
will be used for investing alternative risky projects (moral hazard problem) (Berger and Udell, 
2002). 
2.2. Agency Theory  
“Capital structure is designed to mitigate inefficiencies in the firm’s investment decisions 
that are caused by the information asymmetry” (Harris and Raviv, 1991, p.306). For example, 
as explained by Myers and Majluf (1984), under-pricing becomes severe in a situation where 
managers are better informed about a firm’s value and the firm needs to issue stocks to finance 
a new project. Therefore, they believe that this underinvestment allows new shareholders to 
capture more than the new project’s net present value at the expense of the existing 
shareholders. In this case, by assuming that managers act in the best interest of the existing 
shareholders, the managers refuse to undertake the project even if it is a valuable investment 
opportunity. Finally, they conclude that firms then prefer internal financing or riskless debt to 
equity in order to avoid the underinvestment problem. In short, agency problems resulting from 
asymmetrical information need to be identified and solved for the benefits of mitigating excess 
perquisite consumption (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), expropriation (Morck, Shleifer, and 
Vishny, 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), and the suboptimal investment opportunity (Myers, 
1977). Three fundamental agency problems as well as the solutions are discussed below. 
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First, the conflicts of interest between owners and managers arise because managers do not 
own 100 percent of the residual claim (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In other words, 
management is separated from the ownership. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
managers are usually better informed about the firm’s true situation than the outside investors. 
As a result, it is reasonable to believe that the manager will not always act in the best interest of 
the owner if both parties want to maximize their own utilities (Harris and Raviv, 1991). As 
illustrated in the literature (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny, 2000; Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997), managers tend to use the firm’s profits 
to benefit themselves rather than return the money to the investors. First, managers can sell the 
output, assets or securities to other firms they own at below market prices (La Porta et al., 
2000). Second, it is also possible for managers to overpay the top executives (La Porta et al., 
2000). Third, managers can expropriate owners by staying on the job even if they are incapable 
of managing the firm (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989).  
Second, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) summarize the benefits of being large investors, 
especially when small investors are not fully protected by the legal system. They demonstrate 
that large investors not only have power to protect the money they have invested, but also 
ensure managers to act in their best interests by monitoring. Subsequently, they consider 
expropriation as the fundamental issue between majority and minority shareholders, which 
refers to a process of using large shareholders’ power to maximize their own welfare at the 
expense of minority shareholders by redistributing the wealth. Moreover, Grossman and Hart 
(1988) believe that this expropriation is especially stronger when the large investors own 
superior voting right equity or in a situation where the firm does not implement one-share-one 
vote policy. As a consequence, the interests of large shareholders will no longer coincide with 
the interests of the remaining minority shareholders. For example, large shareholders can 
decide not to pay dividends to all investors instead to pay themselves in a special form, or 
transfer profits to another companies they control (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Furthermore, 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) use Tobin’s Q to measure the relationship between 
management ownership and the firm’s value. Morck et al. (1988) find that the firm’s value 
increases as raising ownership in the range from 0% to 5%, and declines as ownership rises up 
to 25%. One explanation of this finding is that managers improve their performance as 
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management ownership rises up to 5% (Morck et al, 1988). However, once large investors gain 
complete control of the firm as ownership gets beyond to 5%, they “prefer to use firms to 
generate private benefits of control that are not shared by minority shareholders” (Shleifer and 
Vishny,1997, p.759). 
Last, Myers (1977) provides evidences to show that a risky debt contract creates the 
sub-optimal investment opportunity which is the essence of agency conflicts between creditors 
and shareholders. They argue that firms have optimal investment opportunities when they issue 
risk-free debts or use no debt at all. However, firms are responsible for the promised payments 
when issuing risky debts, which will weaken their incentives to undertake some valuable 
investment opportunities. As a consequence, debt financing reduces the firm’s present market 
value and shareholders’ wealth by making sub-optimal decisions. Moreover, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) also notice that the debt contract allows shareholders to capture most of its 
profit if the project yields positive returns; while, creditors are responsible to the cost of failure. 
As a result, they summarize that shareholders have an incentive to invest in risky projects even 
though they are value-decreasing in the hope of obtaining abnormal positive returns. In reality, 
however, the effect of asset substitution, which occurs when a firm chooses to invest too much 
risky, negative net present value investments, weakens the availability of funds provided by 
creditors (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In addition, shareholders will even forgo good 
investments because debt holders have priority to shareholders on claiming the residual when a 
firm is in a bankruptcy (Jensen and Smith, 1985). In a similar way, shareholders who are in a 
financial distress firm even can pay out excess dividends to reduce the residual available that 
can pass on to the debt holders (Jensen and Smith, 1985).  
The nature of agency problems between owners and managers, between majority and 
minority shareholders, and between creditors and shareholders has been demonstrated above. 
Small business debt financing focuses on the agency problems between creditors and 
shareholders, because small firms have serious asymmetric information problems with external 
financing suppliers. It is expected that “firms with high liquidity and low information 
asymmetry exhibit a lower degree of agency cost” (Depken, Nguyen, and Sarkar, 2005, p.2). 
Therefore, solving the agency problems definitely plays a key role in reducing the 
informational asymmetry problem in small business financing. Eventually, it will help small 
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firms build sound reputation and obtain capital with favorable terms. The corporate finance 
literature suggests several mechanisms such as monitoring, bonding, and signaling to reduce 
agency problems root in the information asymmetry (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen and 
Smith, 1985; Ross, 1977).  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out that shareholders can limit the owner-manager 
conflicts by incurring monitoring or by implementing compensation contracts that bond 
managers’ activities with shareholders interests. They indicate that monitoring not only 
includes measuring or observing the performance of decision agents, but also includes 
shareholder control processes over agents through “budget restrictions, compensation policies, 
and operating rules” (p.308). Monitoring activities through the capital market, regulatory 
agencies, financial press, and investors are examples of external monitoring mechanisms 
(Depken et al., 2005). Internal monitoring comes from the boards of directors and the majority 
shareholders (Lippert and Moore, 1995). The corporation’s board of directors has responsibility 
to monitor the top managers’ performance, to decide the CEO’s wage, and to replace the 
managers when it is necessary (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Moreover, Fama (1980) mentions that 
there is also internal monitoring among managers themselves, which arises from higher levels 
of management to the lower managers. Last but not least, the free-riding problem suggests that 
only large shareholders have incentives to monitor managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986).  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) define bonding as a situation that firms expand resources to 
alter investment opportunities and to align the managers’ utility with the shareholders’ interests. 
Depken et al. (2005) consider bonding costs as the costs that the manager undertakes at the 
expense of his own wealth to reduce conflicts of interests. According to Depken et al. (2005), it 
is generally accepted that investors and managers have distinct perspectives on risk tolerance as 
follows. On the one hand, shareholders are considered risk-neutral because they are able to 
diversify their investment portfolios; therefore, they are more likely to invest in risky projects. 
On the other hand, managers are risk-averse because it is impossible for them to diversify their 
human capital, thus, they prefer to undertake low risk projects to protect their managerial 
positions. As a result, Depken et al. (2005) confirm the important role of boding managers’ 
performances with shareholders’ interests in order to reduce agency conflicts between 
managers and shareholders. This can be accomplished through compensation plans in various 
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forms (Brander and Poitevin, 1992; Lippert and Moore, 1995; Smith and Watts, 1982). That is, 
compensation plans, such as salaries and pensions in terms of the nonperformance-based 
compensation, stock options in terms of the market-based performance compensation, and 
bonus plans in terms of the accounting-based performance measure, help mitigate the conflicts 
of interest between managers and shareholders (Smith and Watts, 1982).  
In conclusion, both monitoring and bonding mechanisms make great contributions on 
reducing the agency problems between owners and managers, majority and minority 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen and Smith, 1985). It is worthwhile pointing 
out that monitoring is a substitute for bonding. In other words, monitoring is less likely to be 
used to the extent that the firm aligns the interests of managers and shareholders (Lippert and 
Moore, 1995). In addition, firms will implement monitoring or engage in bonding activities if 
and only if the net benefits of monitoring or bonding are sufficient to cover the associated costs 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, in consideration of the existence of serious information 
asymmetry, small business debt financing mainly relies on the signaling effect in order to solve 
the agency problem between creditors and shareholders. The signaling is considered as one of 
the most effective approaches to mitigate the informational asymmetry issue, in that it sends 
indirect information to convince the lender about the firm’s credibility (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). Zahra and Filatotchev (2004) also indicate that “when asymmetry exists, exchange 
parties usually look for signals that can fill the gaps that exist between what they know and 
what they should know” (p. 889). They also believe that “signals, whether verbal or non-verbal, 
provide useful clues about others’ behavior” (p. 889).  
2.3. Signaling 
Signaling effects have been extensively studied in the literature (Bar-Isaac, 2003; Ross, 
1977; Shieh, 1993; Sobel, 1985; Spence, 1973). Sobel (1985) builds a model for helping people 
decide whether to trust someone in an uncertain situation. In Sobel’s signaling model, the 
receiver (principal) is not sure about the sender’s (agent) performance at the beginning, but the 
receiver will adjust his or her decisions based on the relevant information that he or she gains 
during the relationship. He suggests that reputation can be used as a strong signal to 
demonstrate the sender’s reliable performance and this is only valid if the sender continuously 
carries out his or her responsibilities in a timely and accurate manner. Applying Sobel’s 
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signaling model to the lemon phenomenon described by Akerlof (1970), high-quality used car 
sellers may use reputation as a signal of quality to perspective buyers in an attempt to stop price 
discount.  
Spence (1973) also sets up a model to explain how one party sends some relevant 
information as a signal to another party in order to reduce the problem rooting in asymmetric 
information in the context of a job market. In Spence’s job-market signaling model, good 
employees and bad employees are two categories in the job market and employers tend to offer 
higher wages to good employees. Unfortunately, the employee knows his or her own skills and 
productivity, but the employer is not able to ascertain the type of employee in advance. As a 
result, good employees invest in education as a credible signal in attempts to reveal the level of 
skills to potential employers. This signal not only increases wages that good employees should 
receive but also avoids the free-riding problem taken by bad employees. In the hope of having a 
rigorous result, Spence makes one key assumption that good employees can finish college more 
quickly and easily than bad employees with respect to the same grades from the same 
institution. Therefore, because education and ability are strongly correlated, certain education 
credentials contribute to good employees’ higher productivity. 
Finally, “a firm’s financing decisions are actually signaling devices, conveying information 
on investors about the firm’s business risk and profitability” (Myers, 1977, p.148). On the one 
hand, the pecking order theory indicates that debt financing is a signal illustrating a firm’s 
confidence to succeed. For example, a firm may choose to use debt financing in order to keep 
ownership, to demonstrate its ability of repayment, and to build a sound track record (Berger 
and Udell, 1998). Otherwise, investors tend to believe the inability of repaying the loan if a 
firm relies on equity financing, because all investors share the potential risks (Berger and Udell, 
1998). On the other hand, Ross (1977) develops an incentive-signaling model and suggests that 
debt financing definitely sends a signal about a firm’s high quality based on the following 
assumptions and facts. First, managers are much better informed about a firm’s potential value 
and risk than outside investors, which resulting the existence of information opacity. Second, in 
general, investors evaluate a firm’s value based on the signal sent by managers. Third, it is well 
accepted that debt financing is associated with higher bankrupt costs at any debt level and 
managers are penalized if a firm does not have a good performance. Last, a low quality firm 
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increases the chance of going bankrupt. Therefore, managers who are in a low quality firm will 
not issue more debts in an attempt to imitate a high quality firm, because those managers have 
incentives to reduce bankrupt costs and to secure their jobs. 
Our discussions of signaling in various ways above lead us to believe its ability to deliver 
some meaningful information indirectly. However, the third-party certification is also 
considered as one of the most effective means of signaling (Deaton, 2004). Deaton (2004) 
defines the third-party certification as “external institutions that assess, evaluate, and certify 
quality claims” to address the problem of information asymmetry between insiders and 
outsiders (p. 615). Deaton (2004) also explains that being independent is the necessary 
condition to implement the third-party certification, and it is also the most comparative 
advantage comparing with any other means of signaling. The independence indicates an inverse 
relationship between the quality and the cost to “allow for discrimination on the basis of quality” 
(Deaton, 2004, p.617). That is, a high-quality product reduces the costs of obtaining the 
certification. Equity market and debt market may use different ways to certify the quality of a 
firm to the public. Investment bankers, auditors, and venture capitalists are considered as three 
conventional mechanisms to certify the quality of equity in the initial public offerings market 
(Stover, 1996). For instance, Cumming and Johan (2010) state that “[venture capitals] certify 
the quality of the firm that goes public and thereby increases investor confidence that the firm 
seeking public funding is of sound quality” (p. 229). Large businesses should pay attention on 
these signaling strategies since they tend to finance their projects in the equity market. 
In the credit markets which small businesses focus on, the roles of commercial banks in 
issuing the standby letter of credit and the rating agency are very important considerations to 
the extent of certification (Stover, 1996). On the one hand, borrowers with low credit ratings 
not only display high default rates but also demonstrate the failure to use reputation as a signal, 
so that it is extremely difficult for such borrowers to obtain funds from banks (Diamond, 1991). 
On the other hand, high credit ratings are given to borrowers who have sound reputation by 
continually fulfilling their promised liabilities (Diamond, 1991). It is well accepted that 
borrowers with high credit ratings tend to maintain their reputation by not defaulting in order to 
signal their creditworthiness to banks (Harris and Raviv, 1991). Consequently, this high credit 
rating as a signal reduces the costs of debt, increases the availability of funds, and mitigates the 
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moral hazard and adverse selection problems (Diamond, 1991). Altogether, there are three 
important points to summarize based on the above discussion. First, the lending decisions made 
by commercial banks play a key role in assuring the firms’ quality to outside investors. Second, 
banks tend to make loan decisions based on firms’ track records. Third, a firm’s reputation is 
closely related to its historical financing success.  
Besides the rating agency as an indicator of signaling in the context of certification in the 
credit markets, professionalization is another guideline to certify a firm’s qualification. Studies 
on the impacts of professionalization can be traced back as far as 1955. Newcomer (1955) 
explores three preconditions and two general policies related to professionalization for 
employees and owners to follow in order to enhance the value of the firm. He argues that a firm 
tends to achieve a better performance not only by professionalizing its employees and owners 
with a formal education, long years of experience, and a dedicated attitude toward work, but 
also by establishing a complete set of code of conducts and a professional management team 
Newcomer (1955). Following that, Hall (1968) uses the Likert technique to demonstrate five 
traditional measurements of professionalization, including professional organization reference, 
belief in service to the public, belief in self regulation, sense of calling to field, and feeling of 
autonomy. However, the above points of views are largely based on organizational behavior 
perspective. To the best of our knowledge, the paper by Hellmann and Puri (2002) is the only 
existing empirical study discussed professionalization in the corporate finance literature. 
According to Hellmann and Puri’s paper (2002), venture capitalists play broader roles in the 
professionalization of a new firm’s development. On the one hand, venture capitalists make 
great contributions to the internal organization’s professionalization, including the introduction 
of human resources policy, the adoption of a stock option plan, and the recruitment of sales and 
marketing personnel (Hellmann and Puri, 2002). On the other hand, venture-capital financed 
firms are also more likely to replace the founder with a professional outsider in the position of 
the company’s chief executive officer (Hellmann and Puri, 2002). In short, these effects of 
venture capital send a strong signal of a firm’s high qualification and professionalization to 
potential lenders. Based on the combination of the measurements of professionalization in the 
above stream of literature, professionalization has three dimensions, including the human 
resources structure, the compensation plan, and the code of conducts.  
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In terms of the organizational behavior theory perspective, it is generally accepted that 
human capital is the essential to the development of new firms. Therefore, a person’s 
educational levels and years of work experience are used as proxies for the human resources 
structure (Newcomer, 1955). Newcomer (1955) emphasizes that professionalization is 
represented by the completion of college degree, bachelor degree, master or doctorate degree 
and having increasingly long years of work experience in the same or the related field. In 
addition, the owners and employees’ educational levels, as well as the certification, are 
positively related with an employee’s ethical orientation, which eventually signals a highly 
competitive edge of a professionalized firm (Bigel, 2000). In terms of the corporate finance 
theory perspective, the importance of professionalizing the human resource policies as well as 
the human resource management has been well demonstrated in the literature. Hellmann and 
Puri (2002) interpret human resources structure as the formulation of human resource policies 
including the “recruitment and selection practices” (p. 175). With regard to family-owned firms, 
Dyer (1989) emphasizes that improving the management skills in the areas in finance, 
marketing, and accounting is the leading reason for professionalizing the management team. 
Chittoor and Das (2007) also suggest that a firm is likely to have a better performance by 
having a professionalization of management. That is, a nonfamily professional manager in 
charge of the management may contribute to a family-owned firm's overall performance.  
Based on the above discussion, professionalization is closely related to the use of skilled 
employees in the organization. Empson (1999) proposes two reasons regarding the important 
roles of recruiting and retaining those employees as follows. First, if skilled employees quit 
from a firm, they may take their advanced techniques to its competitor. Second, “the act of 
codifying knowledge will ultimately diminish its market values as codifies knowledge becomes 
demystified” (p. 3). However, retaining skilled employees is always a challenge because of two 
reasons. On the one hand, highly talented employees are considered as scarce resources, and 
therefore, it is hard to retain them because there are always better external opportunities 
available (Teece, 2003). On the other hand, those skilled individuals are also hard to direct 
(Starbuck, 1992). Starbuck (1992) points out that skilled employees have preference for 
autonomy and dislike supervision and formal rules. Several studies show that the stock option 
plan help retain the right employees in both private and public firms (Core and Guay, 2001; 
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Hand, 2008). Hellmann and Puri (2002) also use the stock option as a proxy for 
professionalization. Therefore, a compensation plan, such as a stock option plan, as a proxy for 
professionalization may motivate the right employees to stay on the current firm.   
The most discriminative characteristics of professionalization is its standard code of 
conducts, which guides owners and employees to make decisions based on appropriate moral 
principles or values (Newcomer, 1955). Newcomer, 1955 considers ethical codes as the best 
evidence of quality signaling, since a skilled employee’s efforts coincide with the interests of 
clients. In addition, Starbuck (1992) insists that “ethical codes require [firm owners and 
employees] to serve clients unemotionally and impersonally, without self-interest” (p. 717). For 
these reasons, professionalization is achieved because those firms tend to have higher code of 
conducts than any other organizations in the society (Bigel, 2000). 
2.4. Research Question 
We attempt to investigate the influence of professionalization on new venture debt 
financing in this study. As discussed earlier, studies on professionalization can be traced back as 
far as 1955, and previous studies show a positive relationship between professionalization and 
firm’s performance according to the organizational theory perspective (Golembiewski, 1983; 
Newcomer, 1955). However, to the best of our knowledge, no study has addressed the effects of 
professionalization on small business and new venture debt financing. Therefore, we intend to 
help fill in this gap.  
Based on the literature reviews, small businesses and new ventures heavily rely on debt 
financing. However, information asymmetry causes the agency problems between creditors and 
shareholders, and signals help small businesses reduce such agency problems. 
Professionalization is viewed as a strong signal sent to the potential capital suppliers. As a 
seminal study, Hellmann and Puri (2002) address the role of venture capitalists in 
professionalizing the start-ups firms. In their study, professionalization is measured by the 
human resources policy, the adoption of stock option plans, and the use of marketing staffs. 
Except the standard code of conducts, the measurements of professionalization in Hellmann 
and Puri (2002) are consistent with the dimensions in the literature, such as the human 
resources structure, the compensation plans, and the standard code of conducts. Therefore, 
three dimensions, including the human resources structure, the incentive plan, and the standard 
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code of conducts, are used as proxies for professionalization in this study. However, none of the 
variables can be used as a proxy for standard code of conducts in our data set. In addition, in 
terms of the new venture finance, literature tends to use human resources structure variables as 
control variables. Therefore, our study only focuses on the compensation plan as a proxy for 
professionalization. Because this is an exploratory study, we ask a research question, instead of 
proposing a hypothesis. Our major research question is “Does professionalization help improve 
debt financing of new ventures?” 
According to the agency theory, the compensation plan as a means of incentive 
mechanisms mitigates the conflict of interests between owners and managers. This study 
intends to use the compensation plan as a proxy for professionalization in order to reduce the 
agency problems between creditors and shareholders. Unfortunately, the theoretical link 
between these two different types of agency problems has not been well explored. Brau (2002) 
studies the agency problem connection by proposing that a bank as the better informed party 
will charge a higher interest rate or require more collateral to a small firm if the owner-manager 
agency conflicts tend to affect the firm value. However, according to his empirical results, 
interest rates and collateral requirements are affected by banking relationship, firm size and age 
rather than the owner-manager conflicts. Confirming Brau’s (2002) findings, Wu, Hedges, and 
Zhang (2007) conclude that solutions to the owner-manager conflicts do not significant 
alleviate the creditor-shareholder conflicts on small business lending. In contrast, Brander and 
Poitevin’s (1992) model shows that managerial compensation contracts, in particular bonus 
contract, as a means of aligning the interests of owners and managers, can mitigate the agency 
conflict between shareholders and creditors. The above two opposite views also motivate us to 
study this topic.  
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3. Data and variables   
3.1. Data1 
We extracted the data from the questionnaires of the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS), 
sponsored by the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation and conducted by the Mathematica 
Policy Research Inc. (MPR). The KFS is well known for its longitude, consistency, accuracy, 
and coverage.  
First, despite the challenge, such as business attrition2, in conducting a longitudinal study, 
the KFS is one of the very few surveys that track the performance of the U. S. new businesses 
over their formative period. In other words, only small businesses founded in 2004 were 
selected to engage in the Baseline Survey. Following that, the MPR project team planned to 
conduct seven follow-up surveys annually to track over the same firms’ operation performance. 
Up to the present, the project is at the midpoint and three follow-up has been completed. At the 
end of the project, the KFS will cover the data period from 2004 to 2011 to track the 
development of the U. S. new ventures that stared in 2004.  
Second, consistency is essential to develop any study, and a panel study requires a more 
consistent standard throughout all the surveys. Thus, the MPR project team suggests consistent 
and rigorous criteria for defining new businesses and selecting respondents. On the one hand, 
only businesses, listed in the Dun & Bradstreet (D&B) corporation database in calendar year 
2004, were eligible for the Baseline Survey. The D&B database was used for selecting 
sampling frame because it is the largest commercial list so far containing the insight 
information about businesses. On the other hand, a respondent should belong to a founder or an 
owner who is also involved in business’ day to day operations. In this manner, it ensures the 
respondent to provide accurate information regarding all the areas on the business. Besides that, 
in terms of questionnaires, the further follow-ups only slightly add few related questions on the 
basis of the Baseline Survey. In general, the design and contents are almost identical between 
the Baseline Survey and the further follow-ups.  
Third, the accuracy is guaranteed before, during, and after conducting the longitudinal KFS. 
                                                        
1 The contents in this section (3.1. data) are either based on the “Kauffman Firm Survey methodology report” 
(Ballou, Barton, DesRoches, Potter, Zhao, Santos, and Sebastian, 2007) or “An overview of the Kauffman Firm 
Survey: results from the 2004-2007 data” (Robb, Ballou, DesRoches, Potter, Zhao, and Reedy, 2009). 
2 Business attrition refers to some of the participating businesses in the Baseline Survey will no longer participate 
the follow-up surveys as a consequence of bankruptcy, refusal, or failure to locate the new address. 
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Two pretests were implemented to determine the Baseline Survey’s preparation and 
improvement. The Pilot Test 1 confirmed the criteria of eligible businesses, which included 
those if they begin to pay state unemployment (UI) taxes or federal insurance contribution act 
(FICA) taxes in 2004, or if year 2004 is the first time they have legal forms, employer 
identification numbers (EIN), schedule C incomes on personal tax returns. In addition, 
inherited businesses, wholly owned subsidiary firms, or non-profit organizations were not 
qualified under these criteria. Several suggestions were made after the Pilot Test 2. Firstly, 
one-third of the questionnaires have been reduced. Secondly, a web survey, as well as a 
telephone interviewing follow-up, was used for collecting data. Finally, a $50 incentive was 
paid to owners one week after completing the surveys for thanking their participation. 
Besides that, in the hope of assuring data quality, the MPR project team implements 
several mechanisms, such as an interviewer training course, a performance monitoring, and an 
edit check software, during the Baseline Survey and the follow-ups. First, it is undeniable that 
acknowledgeable and experienced interviewers can lead a higher overall response rate through 
phone call interviews. Therefore, all interviewers are required to take a 12-hour mandatory 
training course. Materials, such as business eligibility criteria, interviewing skills, strategies for 
deal with avoidance respondents, and the importance of confidentiality will be taught during 
the training course. Interviewers then apply the theoretical knowledge in practice by 
implementing mock interviews. During this process, one interviewer acts as a respondent, and 
the other play the role of an interviewer. In general, interviewers can gain experience and build 
confidence during repeated practice. Second, monitoring interviewers’ performance also plays a 
key role in assuring the data accuracy. Project staff generates evaluation reports based on 
interviewers’ performance every week. Then the staff members and each individual interviewer 
review the feedback, such as good interview skills or the difficulty to avoid gatekeepers, 
together during the weekly meeting. Generally, suggestions based on interviewers’ strengths 
and weaknesses provide opportunities to improve interviewers’ performance as well as further 
enhance the response rate. Last but not least. With respect to the telephone interviews, 
interviewers have abilities to check inconsistent information during interviews. For instance, 
interviewers will make sure the data are considered debt or equity. As regards the web surveys, 
edit checks programmed by the project staff allow surveys to automatically correct any 
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numerical inconsistency during the interviews.  
Furthermore, cleaning data also needs special care in order to ensure the accuracy. Some 
open ended questions are available in the Baseline Surveys and the follow-ups, which allow 
respondents to provide their own answers if none of the existing answers fit their situation. 
However, since not all the respondents have enough knowledge or time to understand the 
existing answers, their own responses may actually be very similar to any of the existing 
options. Therefore, back coding, a process to check the similarity between the respondent’s 
answer and the exiting answers, becomes a typical and important task for data accuracy 
purpose, especially for the web surveys.  
Last, the KFS also contains a wide range of information in questionnaires. The 
questionnaires consist of seven sections in total. The first section is the introduction which 
discusses the sponsor, makes sure respondents are owner/founder/operators, and confirms 
business addresses or reasons for bankruptcy. Unlike the follow-up surveys, only the Baseline 
Survey has the second section known as the eligibility screening. Eligible businesses and forms 
of business organization are determined in this section. Section three includes questions related 
to business characteristics, such as industry types, number of employees in terms of full time 
and part time, and number of owners. Questions about the strategy and innovation are asked in 
section four, including whether the business provides a service or a product, whether the 
business owns patents, copyrights, or trademarks, and business sales with different types of 
customers. The fifth section collects information based on the business organization and human 
resources benefits. This section covers employees or owners’ roles in the organization and their 
compensation plans, such as health insurance plans, stock option plans, and paid sick days. The 
financial information in the next section is the focus of the KFS. Sources of financing, 
including equity or debt, are first determined in this section. They are followed by business 
revenues, expenses, profits or losses, and types of assets and liabilities. Topics related to work 
behaviors and demographic of up to ten business owners per firm are included in the last 
section. A respondent needs to answer questions about his or her characteristics, such as, age, 
educational levels, years of experience, race, gender, weekly working hours, and whether she or 
he is also a paid employee. For a multiple-owned business, a respondent first answers the 
questions for himself (herself), and then for other owner/founder/operators. In summary, 
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according to all have been discussed above, the KFS is a reliable resource of data to be used for 
our study. 
The data used in our study are from year 2004 (the Baseline Survey) to year 2007 (the 
Third Follow-up). The four sets of data include all the surveys available so far and there carry 
the most up-to-date information. Project employees spend a full year (from July 2005 to July 
2006) to collect the Baseline Survey. In the end, 4,928 businesses out of 32,469 selected 
businesses were interviewed, indicating overall 43 percent response rate3 after applying for the 
sample weights. Excluding the businesses that permanently out of business from the 4,928 
participating businesses, the MPR project team conducted three follow-ups to look at dynamic 
changes of the firms. For the First Follow-up, data collection started at June 2006 and finished 
in January 2007. A total of 3,998 businesses completed the interviews, resulting in 89 percent 
weighted response rate. From May 31, 2007 to December 1, 2007 and from June 24, 2008 to 
December 23, 2008 were two time intervals for conducting the Second and the Third 
Follow-ups, respectively. Among the eligible businesses, 3,390/2,915 businesses were 
interviewed, showing 84 percent and 83 percent response rates (weight adjusted) in the Second 
and Third Follow-ups, respectively. 
It is noteworthy that our study has two data limitations. One is that the data set contains a 
small portion of outliers. For example, in the case of asking how many full-time employees in 
the business, most of the data are recorded in continuous forms as their original states. However, 
the data set also includes some unusable values, such as more than fifteen (15+) to indicate the 
highest value of certain variables. Since only very small number of cases4 have more than 
                                                        
3 The KFS Baseline Methodology Report defines response rates as “measures of the ‘potential’ for nonresponse 
bias and of the quality of a survey” (Ballou et al., 2007, p.53). In other words, low response rates lead to a larger 
potential for nonresponse bias and a worse survey quality compare with high response rates. It is widely accepted 
that response rates can be divided into weighted response rates and unweighted response rates. The report also 
provides two separate definitions as follows: 
“Unweighted response rates measure the proportion of the sample that resulted in useable information for 
analysis” (Ballou et al., 2007, p.55).  
“Weighted response rates can be used to estimate the proportion of the survey population for which useable 
information is available and is generally considered as a measure of the potential for nonresponse bias” (Ballou et 
al., 2007, p.55). Therefore, weighted response rate is much more appropriate than unweighted response rate, 
because the weighted response rate takes sample selection probability into consideration.  
4 In our study, we remove outliers from six variables, including total number of employees, number of human 
resources person, number of sales person, number of R&D person, number of finance person, and owner’s work 
experience in years. With respect to each variable, four percentages indicate the corresponding outliers in the 
Baseline, the First Follow-up, the Second Follow-up, and the Third Follow-up, respectively. The percentages of 
outliers are reported as follows. 
Total number of employees: 1.14%, 2.28%, 2.83%, and 2.34% 
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fifteen full-time employees. To ensure the accuracy, we cannot change 15+ to 15, and therefore 
treat them as missing values. The other limitation is that the data set only provides a range, 
rather than a precise figure, of values of financial variables, such as total expenses, amounts of 
borrowing from friends, and so on. In other words, the MPR project team preferred ordinal 
variables to continuous variables when they prepared the public use data file. There is no 
problem of using ordinal variables for analyzing models, but continuous variables may generate 
more accurate results. In addition, these ordinal variables cannot be used to construct other 
variables, such as ratios, sums, or products. Consequently, this is likely to reduce the accuracy 
of the results. The following section (the variable descriptive section) will present some real 
examples related to the use of these data limitations in detail.  
3.2. Debt financing (Dependent Variables) 
We use two dummy variables to characterize small business debt financing and two ordinal 
variables to measure the total amount of debt. As mentioned before, because of the difficulty in 
obtaining funds in the equity market, a small business is more likely to rely on debt financing 
from commercial banks or from other non-bank financial institutions with the help of either 
personal or business relationships (Berger and Udell, 2002). Therefore, to measure the use of 
debt, the first dummy variable (Business Bank Loan) is extracted directly from the date set. It 
has a value of one if the business uses business loans from a commercial bank, and zero 
otherwise. Business Loan as the second dummy variable, whose value is one if the business 
uses business loans from either a commercial bank or a non-bank financial institution, and zero 
otherwise. This variable is constructed based on two dummy variables in the data set. One is 
our first dependent variable (Business Bank Loan); the other is a dummy variable, whose value 
is one if the business uses business loans from a non-bank financial institution, and zero 
otherwise.  
In previous studies, the use of debt is usually measured by financial leverage, the total debt 
to book value of assets ratio (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1994). However, it is impossible to 
construct the debt to asset ratio even though both variables are available in the data set due to 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Number of human resources person (HR): 0.52%, 0.34%, 0.55%, and 0.29% 
Number of sales person (Sales): 2.1%, 2.96%, 3.00%, and 3.48% 
Number of R&D person (R&D): 0.98%, 1.24%, 1.49%, and 1.86% 
Number of finance person (Finance): 0.49%, 0.38%, 0.27%, and 0.39% 
Owner’s work experience in years (Work Exp): 3.81%, 4.2%, 3.89%, and 4.08% 
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the data limitation. Therefore, two ordinal variables (Total Debt and Total Business Debt) are 
employed instead for measuring the amount of debt in this study. The former one measures the 
total amount of business loans and personal loans for business-related purposes, while the latter 
one represents the total business loans only due to business-related purposes. The data set 
contains those two variables in ordinal forms, using numerical values from zero to nine, to 
represent the amount of respective debt5.  
3.3. Professionalization (Independent Variables) 
As mentioned earlier in the research question, our study focuses on the effects of 
compensation plans as a proxy for professionalization on debt financing of new ventures. This 
is consistent with the professionalization measure in the finance literature (e.g., Hellmann and 
Puri 2002). The data set contains several dummy variables to measure employee benefit plans, 
including a health insurance plan, a retirement plan, a stock option plan, a bonus plan, a paid 
vacation plan, a paid sick day plan, and a tuition reimbursement plan. Among those benefit 
plans, our proxy variable (Incentive Plan) is constructed based on stock options, bonus plans, 
and the vacation paid. Therefore, Incentive Plan is also a dummy variable, whose value is one if 
the business offers a compensation plan in any forms among bonus plans, vacation paid plans, 
and/or stock option plans, and zero if the business does not implement any of these 
compensatory plans.  
The use of stock options is consistent with the professionalization measure adopted by 
Hellmann and Puri (2002). It is also worthwhile to point out that stock options are widely used 
in both public and private firms. On the one hand, the effects of stock options in publicly listed 
firms have been intensively studied (Core and Guay, 2001; Oyer and Schaefer, 2005). Core and 
Guay (2001) find that firms are more like to use stock options for retaining the right employees 
and helping increase firm value, especially when they are lack of financial resources or have 
                                                        
5 The ranges of each category are indicated as below,  
0. 0 
1. $500 or less 
2. $501 to $1,000 
3. $1,001 to $3,000 
4. $3,001 to $5,000 
5. $5,001 to $10,000 
6. $10,001 to $25,000 
7. $25,001 to $100,000 
8. $100,001 to $1,000,000 
9. $1,000,001 or more 
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greater financing needs. The empirical evidence in Oyer and Schaefer (2005) supports the roles 
of stock options in retaining the right employees and sorting the employees’ belief about the 
firms. On the other hand, Hand (2008) evaluates the use of stock options in privately held firms, 
even though his finding demonstrates that 27% private U.S. start-up companies do not offer 
stock options to their employees based on the cost-benefit analysis. We also add two variables 
(bonus plans and paid vacation plans) when we create the professionalization variable because 
they capture the short-term incentives. According to a survey asking employees to choose their 
most desired benefits plan among seven options, extra paid vacation and a yearly bonus are 
ranked the first (38%) and the second (36%), respectively (Lissy, 1992). In addition, the paid 
vacation also increases the productivity, enhances the quality of employees’ life, helps achieve 
better health outcomes for individual employees, and reduces the overall health care 
expenditure (De Graaf, 2009). All the evidences above imply that bonus plans and paid 
vacation plans are the most effective means to motivate employees to work hard and/or stay in 
the current company. 
Intuitively, we expect a positive relationship between the incentive plan and debt financing 
of new ventures. As discussed in the literature reviews, the incentive plan helps enhance firm 
performance. In other words, a company is predicted to have a better performance if it has an 
incentive plan in some forms. Therefore, on the supply6 side, this is a good signal to convince 
investors that the company is more likely to have the ability to repay its loan on time. As a 
result, investors are more likely to provide funds in the short run if they receive and believe in 
the credibility of this signal. On the demand side, a better performed company also tends to 
issue debt to keep ownership, to reduce costs, and to signal its confidence to succeed.  
3.4. Control variables  
Two sets of control variables are included to capture the characteristics of the firm and its 
owners, respectively.  
3.4.1. Firm characteristics  
According to Hrebiniak (1976), even though the organizational size is kept constant, the 
level of professionalization affects the structure of the organization. In other words, the various 
                                                        
6 In this study, the supply constraint refers to the amount of loans that lenders are willing to provide at various 
interest rates. The demand constraint refers to the amount of loans that small firms are willing to borrow at various 
interest rates.  
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employee functional compositions result in different consequences in terms of corporate 
governance and investment control. Therefore, four variables are used as the proxies for 
employees’ expertise and functionality in the business. The continuous variables HR, Sales, 
R&D, and Finance capture the percentage of employees and owners who are responsible for 
human resources, sales, research & development, and the financial administrative, respectively. 
We construct those four variables by dividing total number of employees and owners who are 
primarily responsible for the above areas respectively by the sum of total number of employees 
and owners. We also introduce another variable (Personnel) to measure the total number of 
persons who are responsible for all the areas together. The variable (Personnel) has the same 
denominator as before; however, the sum of all four categories (HR, Sales, R&D, and Finance) 
becomes the numerator. Due to the data limitation (discussed earlier in Section 3.1), more than 
twenty-five total employees (25+) and more than five HR, Sales, R&D, and Finance (5+) are 
excluded before we create the variables. In addition, very few inconsistent cases7, such as the 
percentage over 100%, are also excluded when we review the constructed variables.  
Firm size also needs to be considered because larger firms are expected to have a better 
borrowing ability. Follow the literature; we measure the firm size using the firm’s total assets 
(Total Assets) as a control variable. This measure has been more widely adopted in numerous 
previous studies, such as Berger and Udell (1995), Chittenden, Hall, and Hutchinson (1996), 
and Elyasiani and Goldberg (2004). The ordinal variable (Total Assets) is from the original 
data set, using zero to nine to represent the ranges of assets in each level8. Since the 
information about firm size provided in the data set is not a continuous variable, we cannot use 
the logarithm value of total assets to normalize them.  
We also include the legal forms of the organization and industry types as control variables 
for measuring firm characteristics. Respectively, three dummy variables are used to represent a 
firm that is owned and managed by the same person (Sole Owner), a legal entity separates from 
                                                        
7 In our study, “inconsistent case” refers to a situation where the percentage is over 100%. In general, less than 1% 
of cases are inconsistent. The detail percentages of each variable are presented as below. With respect to each 
variable, four percentages indicate the corresponding inconsistent cases in the Baseline, the First Follow-up, the 
Second Follow-up, and the Third Follow-up, respectively. 
Number of human resources person (HR): 0.13%, 0.32%, 0.12%, and 0.10% 
Number of sale person (Sales): 0.80%, 0.77%, 0.42%, and 0.84% 
Number of R&D person (R&D): 0.41%, 0.54%, 0.17%, and 0.57% 
Number of R&D person (Finance): 0.54%, 0.47%, 0.16%, and 0.41% 
8 The variable (Total assets) has the same ranges as the variables in Footnote 5.  
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their owners that may engage in own rights and liabilities (Corporation), and a type of business 
in which two or more owners share the profits or losses (Partnership). Industry sectors are 
divided into eight categories and characterized by seven dummy variables9 based on the North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS). Industry variables have been used for all 
model analysis, but the results are not reported in the paper because of two reasons. First, the 
industry effects are not focus of our study. Second, industry variables yield overall mixed 
results.  
3.4.2. Owner’s characteristics  
In the literature on small business financing, the effect of owner’s characteristics have been 
widely recognized. It is expected that people become more conservative on financing decisions 
as they become older, devote more formal school education, and have more work experience. 
Therefore, control variables measuring the owner’s characteristic include owner’s age, 
educational level, and work experience. Both single-owner businesses and multiple-owner 
businesses participate in the survey. Therefore, we need to pay special attention when we 
construct these sets of variables. This is because up to ten owner’s attributes are recorded with 
respect to the multiple-owner company. In terms of constructing the owner’s age, for each 
company, the data set has the records of all individual owners’ ages. The highest age among all 
owners determines the owner’s age for that company. The same as its original state, Age Owner 
is an ordinal variable, using one to seven to represent an owner’s age10.  
In terms of owner’s educational level, we first find one owner, who has the highest degree, 
to determine the owner’s level of education for each firm. Then, those ten levels of education 
categories in the original data set have been amalgamated into four classes, including, high 
school degree, post secondary degree, post graduated degree, and others. Finally, the owner’s 
educational level can be measured by three dummy variables High School, Post Secondary, 
                                                        
9 The eight categories of industry sectors are agriculture, construction, manufacturing, wholesale trade, financial 
industry, health care, food industry, and other services. In order to reduce the multicollinearity problem, we 
exclude the financial industry, which has the largest proportion.  
10 The ranges of owner’s age are displayed as follows, 
1. 18-24 
2. 25-34 
3. 35-44 
4. 45-54 
5. 55-64 
6. 65-74 
7. 75+ 
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Post Graduate, whose value is one if the owner has a high school degree, post secondary degree, 
or post graduate degree, respectively, and zero otherwise.  
The information about owner’s work experience in the original data set contains outliers. 
For instance, a small number of cases are recorded as 40+ to represent an owner who has 40 or 
more years of work experience. As discussed earlier in the data limitation section, we focus on 
continuous variables and treat the outliers as missing data. In the end, a continuous variable 
(Work Exp) captures the highest years of work experience among all the owners in a firm. 
Previous studies support the existence of racial and gender discrimination in the credit 
market (Blanchflower, Levine, and Zimmerman 2003; Cavalluzzo et al., 2002; Riding and 
Swift, 1990). Thus, owner’s gender and race are also controlled in our study. With respect to 
the gender, we first calculate the total number of male owners and female owners in each 
business separately. A dummy variable (Male) is used as a proxy of owner’s gender, which has 
a value of one if majorities of owner/founder/operators are male in the business, and zero 
otherwise.  
Finally, according to Robb, Fairlie, and Robinson (2009), the race has three categories 
including white, Hispanic, and others, such as blacks or African Americans, Asians, Pacific 
Islanders, American Indians, or Alaskan Natives. Robb et al. (2009) considers the later two 
categories the visible minority. Therefore, we use the variable non-white as a proxy for visible 
minority in our study and construct the proxy variable (Minority) in a similar way as it is for 
the owner’s gender in the previous. For each company, total number of white owners and 
non-white owners (a member of visible minorities) are counted at first. The majority number 
between white owners and visible minority owners determines the owner’s race. At the end, a 
dummy variable (Minority) is used in our analysis, whose value is one if majorities of 
owner/founder/operators are member of visible minorities, and zero otherwise.  
3.5. Variables measuring change in professionalization  
An alternative approach to investigate the effects of professionalization on new venture 
debt financing is to make use of the improvement in professionalization. We measure the 
professionalization variable changes between the First Follow-up and the Baseline Survey, 
between the Second Follow-up and the First Follow-up, between the Third Follow-up and the 
Second Follow-up, and the change within the pooled sample using all four surveys. As 
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discussed above in section 3.2., we have two dummy dependent variables (Business Bank Loan 
and Business Loan) and two ordinal dependent variables (Total Debt and Total Business Debt). 
To ensure the robustness, those dependent variables are turned into two versions of change 
variables due to different scenarios. One set of change is a dummy variable, whose value is one 
if the change (Change Business Bank Loan, Change Business Loan, Change Total Debt, and 
Change Total Business Deb) is positive, and zero if the change is negative. For instance, we 
assign one if Business Bank loan in the Third Follow-up is greater than it is in the Second 
Follow-up, and zero if it is lower. The other set of change is also a dummy variable, whose 
value is one if the change (Change Business Bank Loan, Change Business Loan, Change Total 
Debt, and Change Total Business Deb) is positive, but zero if the change is negative or zero. 
Besides the changes in dependent variables, we also employ changes in the independent 
variable (Incentive Plan) as well as one of the control variables (Total Assets). By using 
different time intervals, the variable Incentive Plan/ Total Assets in the former period subtracted 
from the later period gives the Change Incentive plan and the Change Total Assets, respectively.  
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4. Methodology  
We first introduce the baseline model to examine the effects of professionalization on new 
venture debt financing:  
Dependent Variables = ܽ଴ ൅ ܽଵ ൈ Professionalization Variable 
                                ൅ܽଶ ൈ Firm characteristics 
                        ൅ܽଷ ൈ Owner characteristics ൅ εଵ                        (1)      
Dependent variables include Business Bank Loan, Business Loan, Total Debt, and Total 
Business Debt. The professionalization variable is measured by Incentive Plan. Control 
variables include both firm and owner characteristics.  
In the baseline model, all four subsamples based on four surveys (the Baseline Survey, the 
First Follow-up, the Second Follow-up, and the Third Follow-up), as well as the pooled sample 
using all four surveys, are used for testing the effects of professionalization on new venture 
debt financing. Logit models are employed since Business Bank Loan and Business Loan are 
binary variables. We adopt three different methods for another two ordinal dependent variables 
(Total Debt and Total Business Debt) to ensure the robustness. First, the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regressions are used since we treat them as continuous variables. Second, one-sided tobit 
models are adopted because they are censored at zero. Finally, we also use the ordered logit 
models for the robustness checks. The sole-owner cases might have different agency problems 
compare to other forms of organizations. Therefore, all the models above are first estimated 
using the full samples, and then the sub-samples by excluding all the sole-owner cases. It is 
noteworthy that we also add three year dummy variables (Baseline, First, Second) for the 
pooled sample analysis in order to control the fixed effects. A significant positive coefficient 
ܽଵ  on Incentive Plan would indicate that professionalization improves new venture debt 
financing.   
As mentioned earlier, the incentives help retain the right employees, so there is a potential 
causality issue between personnel (HR, Sales, R&D, and Finance) and Incentive Plan. In other 
words, the personnel may induce the implementation of the incentive plan. In order to control 
the causality issue, therefore, we further adopt two-stage models measured by dummy variables 
Business Bank Loan and Business Loan as well as by continuous variables Total Debt and Total 
Business Debt to test the effects of professionalization on new venture debt financing. The 
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equation for the first stage is as follows: 
Incentive plan = ܤ଴ ൅ ܤଵ ൈ HR ൅ ܤଶ ൈ Sales ൅ ܤଷ ൈ R&ܦ ൅ ܤସ ൈ Finance 
                                ൅ܤହ ൈ Other firm characteristics  
                                ൅ܤ଺ ൈ Owner characteristics ൅ εଶ                     (2.1) 
In the first stage, we measure the relationship between Incentive Plan and the use of 
personnel, including HR, Sales, R&D, and Finance. A probit model is used for one of the 
subsamples, the Third Follow-up, and the pooled sample using all four surveys because 
Incentive plan is a binary variable. We then generate the inverse Mills ratios (Invmills) and 
treat it as the independent variable in the second stage of the model. The inverse Mills ratios 
(Invmills) measure the probabilities of using the incentive plan. The equation for the second 
stage is as below:  
Dependent Variables = C଴ ൅ ܥଵ ൈ Invmills 
                                ൅ ܥଶ ൈ  Firm characteristics 
                                ൅ ܥଷ ൈ Owner characteristics ൅ εଷ                      (2.2) 
Dependent variables include Business Bank Loan, Business Loan, Total Debt and Total 
Business debt. Firm characteristics represent HR, Sales, R&D, Finance, Total Assets, Sole 
Owner, Corporation, Partnership, and industry types. Owner characteristics represent owner 
work experience, educational levels, race, and age. 
One of the owner’s characteristics Male is used as the instrumental variable (IV), and it is a 
valid IV both statistically and conceptually. By using the same sample sources, the Third 
Follow-up and the pooled sample using all four surveys, as model 2.1, Model 2.2 is estimated 
using probit models for the former two dependent variables and using ordinary least squares 
regressions for the latter two. A significant coefficient on the inverse Mill’s ratio ܥଵ would 
indicate that professionalization affects new venture debt financing after controlling the 
potentially causality issue.  
Model 3 measures the effects of change incentive plan on the change in new venture debt 
financing. The equation for Model 3 is:  
Dependent Variable = d଴ ൅ dଵ ൈ Change Incentive Plan ൅ dଶ ൈ Change Total Assets 
                               ൅݀ଷ ൈ  Firm characteristics 
                               ൅݀ସ ൈ Owner characteristics ൅ εସ,                       (3) 
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where dependent variables include Change Business Bank Loan, Change Business Loan, 
Change Total Debt, and Change Total Business Debt.  
As mentioned in the section 3.5., there are two distinct definitions of those dependent 
variables measuring changes in small business debt finance. The former one is used for Model 
3: the change dependent variable is a dummy variable, whose value is one if the change is 
positive, and zero if the change is negative. There are two sample sources for analyzing the 
change in debt financing of new ventures. One sample source is derived from the Third 
Follow-up minus the Second Follow-up. Control variables measuring firm characteristics as 
well as owner characteristics in the Second Follow-up are used for this analysis. The other 
sample source is derived from the change in pooled sample using all four surveys. The 
dependent variables are constructed based on the sum of changes between the adjacent time 
intervals. That is, the sum of the differences between every two years of the same company. 
The control variables measuring firm and owner characteristics in the pooled sample using the 
Baseline, the First, and the Second Follow-up are used for this analysis. Model 3 is repetitively 
estimated using logit models because all four dependent variables are binary variables. The 
same as before, the models are estimated using the full samples as well as the sub-samples by 
excluding all the sole-owner cases. A significant coefficient on the variable Change Incentive 
Plan dଵ  would indicate that there is a relationship between a new venture’s change in 
professionalization and the change in its debt financing.  
To further investigate the effect of change in professionalization on the change in new 
venture debt financing, we redefine and reconstruct our change dependent variables. The 
equations are as below:  
Dependent Variable = e଴ ൅ ݁ଵ ൈ Change Incentive Plan ൅ eଶ ൈ Change Total Assets 
                             ൅݁ଷ ൈ  Firm characteristics             
                                              ൅݁ସ ൈ Owner characteristics ൅ εହ                        (4) 
Similar to Model 3, the dependent variables include Change Business Bank Loan, Change 
Business Loan, Change Total Debt, and Change Total Business Debt, but with distinct variable 
interpretations and constructions. In Model 4, all dependent variables are dummies, whose 
values are one if the changes are positive, and zero if the changes are negative or zero. Model 4 
is estimated using logit models.  
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Except the interpretation and the construction of dependent variables, Model 4 follows the 
same procedures as Model 3. First, models are estimated using two sample resources. One is 
based on the difference between the Third Follow-up and the Second Follow-up, while the 
other is based on the change in the pooled sample. Second, models are estimated using the full 
samples and then the sub-samples by excluding all the sole-owner cases.  
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5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 1 presents the summary statistics based on the pooled sample using all 
four surveys. According to the descriptive statistics in Panel A of Table 1, on average 6.5% of 
small businesses used business loans from a commercial bank in the period 2004-2007. 7.8% of 
small businesses obtained debt financing from either a commercial bank or a non-bank 
financial institution during the sample period. In this 4-year period, the firm’s average amount 
of total business loans and total personal loans for business-related purposes was 3, 
representing the firm’s total debt in a range from $1,001 to $3,000 on average. The firm also 
had 1.481 total business loans on average during this period, indicating that the average amount 
of total business loans used by the firm was between $501 and $1,000. Many companies did not 
have any loans, eventually lowering the amount of total debt and total business debt. When we 
excluded all the firms with zero debt, the average total debt and total business debt were both 
5.5 during the sample period, representing a range between $10,001 and $25,000, respectively.  
The percentage of firms which have offered an incentive plan in any forms among stock 
option plans, bonus plans, or paid vacation plans to either full-time or part-time employees was 
45.3% on average from 2004 to 2007. On average 20.1%, 32.2%, 26.2%, and 30.7% of 
employees or owners were primarily responsible for human resources department, marketing 
and sales department, research and development department, and financial administrative 
department, respectively during the sample period. According to the summary statistics of the 
variable Personnel, on average one person was responsible for all the above areas. The average 
size of the business in terms of total assets was between $10,001 and $25,000 in 2004 to 2007. 
The average age of the owners was in a range from 45 to 54 years. Owners had 13.250 years 
work experience on average. 79.8% of the owners were male, and 13.7% were members of 
visible minorities. On average, 8.5%, 58.7%, and 31.1% of the owners had high school degrees, 
post secondary degrees, or post graduate degrees, respectively. 31.7% and 31.1% of the firms 
were sole owner and corporation, respectively.  
[Insert Panel A of Table 1 here] 
Panel B of Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of all four subsamples based on four 
surveys in each calendar year during the sample period. In general, the statistics in each 
35 
 
calendar year are consistent with that of the pooled sample from 2004 to 2007 as described 
above. To spare space, we do not repeat the results here. However, there is at least one thing 
worth mentioning. According to this panel, the percentage of firms offering incentive plans has 
been steadily rising during the sample period. 39.7% of businesses offered the incentive plan to 
either full-time or part-time employees as of 2004. In 2005, the percentage of firms offering 
incentive plans increased to 45.6%. On average 47.2% and 50.6% of businesses offered 
incentive plans in 2006 and 2007, respectively. These results suggest that firms tend to become 
more professionalized over time when they grow.  
[Insert Panel B of Table 1 here] 
Panel C of Table 1 shows the changes in debt financing variables and incentive plans over 
three adjacent time intervals (comparison between the First Follow-up and the Baseline, 
between the Second and the First, between the Third and the Second) as well as over the period 
from 2004 to 2007. There are several general findings based on this Panel. First, the majority of 
firms (approximately 90%) did not change their borrowing status. Second, slightly more firms 
increase the use of debt. That is, the number of increasing cases (4.8%) is slightly higher than 
that of the decreasing cases (4.7%). Third, 47% and 65% of firms maintained the same level of 
borrowing in terms of total debt and total business debt. Fourth, the change in Total Debt had a 
mean around 3.3 for both increasing and decreasing cases, indicating a range between $3,001 
and $5,000. On average, the change in Total Business Debt was 4.2, representing a relatively 
higher range from $5,001 to $10,000. Last, the independent variable Change Incentive Plan 
follows the same pattern as above. That is, a majority of firms (81.7%) on average did not 
change their compensation plans.  
[Insert Panel C of Table 1 here] 
Results from the compare-mean tests are presented in Panel D of Table 1. As indicated in 
Panel D, except for the Total Business Debt, the averages of two groups were not statistically 
different from each other in the initial period, which indicates insufficient evidence showing 
that firms change their debt financing significantly. This insignificant change may be caused by 
two possible reasons: new ventures are not very likely to borrow, or they rely on internal 
financing at the early stage. The former view has been supported by Guiso (2003); the 
empirical findings in his study show that the limited bank debt is more likely to result from that 
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firms decide not to borrow rather than banks choose not to lend. The later view is consistent 
with the financial growth cycle perspective by Berger and Udell (1998). They argue that a 
small business focuses on internal financing at the beginning, and may rely on short term 
external credit at the firm’s growing stage. According to this panel, dependent variables 
become statistically different from each other at the most recent period (last column of the 
Panel: The Third follow-up minus the Second Follow-up), which coincides with the financial 
growth cycle perspective again.  
In general, the mean differences of the proxy for professionalization (Incentive Plan) were 
statistically different from zero. The positive change in Incentive Plan suggests that owners 
may understand the important roles of a compensation plan as they continue to operate the 
company.   
 [Insert Panel D of Table 1 here] 
5.2. The effects of professionalization on new venture debt financing (Baseline Model)  
Table 3 presents the results based on Model 1. A total of sixteen versions of Model 1 (4 
dependent variables × 2 sample sources × 2 sample sizes) were estimated. The four dependent 
variables are Business Bank Loan, Business Loan, Total Debt, and Total Business Debt. The 
two sample sources include the Third Follow-up (year 2007) and the pooled sample from 2004 
to 2007. The full samples and the sub-samples by excluding the sole proprietorship were 
adopted. Panel A and B report the results based on the full samples, which contains the analysis 
for the Third Follow-Up and the pooled sample using all four surveys, and Panel C and D show 
the results based on the sub-samples. As mentioned in the methodology section, we employed 
the OLS regressions, Tobit models, and ordered logit models11 for the two ordinal dependent 
variables (Total Debt and Total Business Debt). The results of using the one-sided Tobit models 
are reported in Panel E and F of Table 3.   
[Insert Panel A. B. C. D. E. and F of Table 3 here] 
According to Panel A to Panel F of Table 3, Incentive Plan is significantly positively 
related to debt financing in all the sixteen regressions. Using logit models, we find that the 
adoption of incentive plans significantly increases the odds of using debt financing. Statistically, 
                                                        
11 The results of using ordered logit models for Total Debt and Total Business Debt are not reported in the tables. 
There is no qualitative difference in the results and the results are available upon request.  
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according to the results presented in column 1 of Panel A, for a one unit increase in adopting 
plans, the odds of being borrowed for a bank or a non-bank financial institution (vs. not being 
borrowed) increased by a factor of 2.166. Using OLS regressions or Tobit models, the results 
lead to the conclusion that the adoption of incentive plans is associated with expanded amount 
of loans. Statistically, according to the results presented in column 1 of Panel B, a firm 
adopting incentive plans uses 81.0% more debt than a firm which does not adopt incentive 
plans. In summary, the results are consistent since the models by using four different dependent 
variables, two distinct sample sources, and two sample sizes serve as robustness checks. 
Therefore, we conclude that professionalization tends to improve new venture debt financing.  
It is worth pointing out that the unknown willingness to use external debt is one of the 
limitations of this study. That is, we cannot tell whether the debt financing variables employed 
in our study are interpreted from the supply perspective or from the demand perspective. As a 
consequence, we have to take both sides into consideration for the analysis. As mentioned in 
the literature reviews, a firm is more likely to have a better performance if it offers incentive 
plans to its employees and owners. Therefore, on the supply side, such firms are more likely to 
obtain debt financing because a firm with good performance has low default risks. On the 
demand side, a firm with good performance tends to issue debt to maintain ownership control, 
to reduce the costs, and to signal its confidence to succeed.  
Several control variables also have significant impacts on debt financing. The variable 
Total Assets is always significantly positively related to the use of debt and to the amount of 
debt, which suggests that a larger firm tends to obtain more debt from lenders when the firm 
has more assets as collaterals. The other control variables, including Finance, Sole Owner, 
Partnership, Work Exp, High School, Post Secondary, Post Graduate, Minority, and Age Owner, 
also significantly affect debt finance of new ventures.  
5.3. The effects of professionalization on new venture debt financing (Two-stage Model) 
To effectively control the causality issue, a two-stage model was used to further test the 
impacts of professionalization on new venture debt financing. Panel A of Table 4 presents the 
results of the first stage, which addresses the potential impacts of using human resource 
management on the adoption of incentive plan. Since Incentive Plan is a dummy, the inverse 
Mills ratios (Invmills) were generated from the first stage and were employed as proxies for 
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professionalization in the second stage.  
[Insert Panel A of Table 4 here] 
In the first stage, Incentive Plan is the dependent variable. Model 2.1 was estimated using 
probit models based on two samples as before. One is the Third Follow-up; the other is the 
pooled sample using all four surveys. Two versions of Model 2.1 were estimated. According to 
Panel A of Table 4, the significantly positive coefficient on HR indicates that it increases the 
probability of using incentive plans. However, the significantly negative coefficients on R&D 
and Finance show that they decrease the probability of using incentive plans. In general, the 
variable Personnel is negatively and significantly related to the use of Incentive Plan. The 
results also show that a larger firm in terms of the size (Total Assets) is more likely to offer 
incentive plans to employees. Due to the severe agency problems between owners and 
managers, a corporation is also more likely to offer incentive plans than a sole proprietorship or 
a partnership.   
The second stage of model 2 measures whether Invmills, as a proxy for professionalization, 
influences the use of debt financing and the amount of debt. Eight versions of Model 2.2 were 
estimated and the results are presented in Panel B and C of Table 4 (4 dependent variables × 2 
sample sources).  
[Insert Panel B and C of Table 4 here] 
From the table, if we focus on the results of the Third Follow-up, the incentive plan only 
plays a role on the Total Business Debt. Statistically, according to the results presented in 
column four of Panel C, a firm adopting incentive plans uses more debt than a firm which does 
not adopt incentive plans. However, with respect to the analysis of the pooled sample using all 
four surveys, the use of incentive plan always significantly increases the use of debt and 
amount of debt used. Therefore, the above analysis leads to the conclusion that 
professionalization has significantly impacts on debt financing and the effects are more 
pronounced in a relatively long period of time.  
5.4. The effects of change in professionalization on the change in New Venture Debt 
Financing.   
To investigate the impacts of professionalization on debt financing thoroughly, we make 
use of the improvement in professionalization as the independent variable. The results of Model 
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3 are presented in Table 5, while the results of Model 4 are summarized in Table 6. As 
discussed before, the difference between Model 3 and Model 4 lies in the interpretation and 
construction of the dependent variables. A total of sixteen versions of each model (4 dependent 
variable × 2 sample sources × 2 sample sizes) were estimated.  
[Insert Panel A, B, C and D of Table 5 here] 
As the results from Table 5, the coefficients on the change in Incentive Plan are positive 
and statistically significant in the models with Change Business Bank Loan and Change 
Business Loan as the dependent variables, while those are statistically insignificant in the other 
two models with Change Total Debt and Change Total Business Debt as the dependent 
variables. Statistically, according to the results presented in column 1 of Panel A, a firm 
moving to the use of inventive plans is more likely to increase the use of debt, compared to a 
firm which does not change. The strong positive relationship suggests that a firm has a higher 
probability of obtaining debt from either a commercial bank or a non-bank financial institution 
as the firm adopts incentive plans the first time.  
According to the results, we observe that the change in firm size (Change Total Assets) has 
a strongly positive relationship with the change in the amount of debt (Change Total Debt, and 
Change Total Business Debt) and a weakly positive relationship with the change in the use of 
debt (Change Business Bank Loan, and Change Business Loan). In conclusion, these results 
suggest that a larger firm is more likely to obtain debt financing.  
The owner’s educational level, race, and age continue to show a negative impact on the 
debt financing as before. In addition, a sole proprietorship or a partnership firm is less likely to 
use external credit. On the demand side, those small businesses (usually smaller than a 
corporation in terms of the size) are more likely to obtain funds from friends and a start-up 
team rather than from a bank at their initial stages. Alternatively, they are less likely to apply 
credit from a bank due to fear of being denied.  
[Insert Panel A, B, C, D of Table 6 here] 
Table 6 presents the results for Model 4. According to the results, the positive and 
statistically significant coefficients on the change in Incentive plan confirm that the increasing 
in use of incentive plans has a positive impact on the change in debt financing. Moreover, in 
general, the coefficients on the Change Total Assets are also positive and statistically 
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significant in the change in debt financing. This result is also consistent with the previous 
discussion: a large firm tends to use more external credit. In short, to summarize the results of 
Table 5 and Table 6, empirical evidence supports that increasing in professionalization has 
greater effects on the increase in new venture debt financing.  
5.5. Robustness Tests 
To check for multicollinearity, we calculate the variance inflation factor (VIFs) for the 
variables. In general, multicollinearity does not introduce a bias if the VIF for each variable is 
10 or lower. In this study, multicollinearity is not a significant concern since the average value 
of VIFs is 2.7.  
To ensure the robustness of our results, we first replace the HR, Sales, R&D, and Finance 
by Personnel, and re-estimate all the models mentioned above. Based on Tables 3-6, the results 
after this change remain consistent. Second, we re-estimate the model based on the pooled 
sample using all four surveys in two different ways. In order to capture the year effect, we 
replace the three year dummies to a continuous variable represented by numerical values, one, 
two, three, and four. Although the results are not reported, there is no qualitative change in the 
results. We then control the fixed and random effects by re-estimating the models and 
regressions in the panel setting. According to the results presented in Table 7, the use of 
Incentive Plan is significantly and positively related to debt financing of new ventures in all 
these cases. According to the Hausman test, fixed effects should be used.  
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6. Conclusions and limitations 
Debt financing is a major source of capital for small firms and new venture. However, it is 
also a challenge for them to obtain debt financing because of the information asymmetry 
problems. Solving the agency problems between borrowers and lenders definitely plays a key 
role in reducing the informational asymmetry problem in small business and new venture debt 
financing. Eventually, it will help them improve their access to external financing. Signaling as 
one of solutions to the agency problem is considered as the most effective approach to reduce 
the information asymmetry because it sends indirect information to convince the lender about 
the firm’s credibility (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Zahra and Filatotchev, 2004). 
Professionalization may be viewed as a strong signal sent to the potential capital suppliers. 
According to the agency theory, this positive signal may help firm owner succeed in applying 
for financing. According to Golembiewski (1983), a professionalized firm is much related to a 
good performance. On the supply side, such firm is more likely to obtain debt financing 
because a firm with good performance reduces the default risk. On the demand side, a firm with 
good performance tends to use debt to keep ownership control, to reduce the costs, and to 
signals the firm’s high quality. In this way, professionalization tends to increase the use of debt 
financing.  
In this study, we follow Hellmann and Puri (2002) and use the compensation plan, 
measured by a dummy variable, whose value is one if a business offers a compensation plan in 
any forms among stock options, bonus plans, and/or paid vacation plans, and zero if the firm 
does not offer any of these compensation plans, as a proxy for professionalization. We find that 
the adoption of incentive plan is positively and significantly related to the use and amount of 
new venture debt financing. These findings are robust according to various empirical models.   
This study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, it is one of early studies 
investigate the relationship between professionalization and new venture debt financing. 
Second, this study also adds to the agency theory literature by showing that the solution to 
owner-manager agency problem may also help mitigate the creditor-shareholder conflicts. 
According to the literature, the theoretical link between owner-manager and 
shareholder-creditor agency problem has not been well explored. To the best of our knowledge, 
there are only two paper address the theoretical link between these two different types of 
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agency problems but with opposite conclusions. Based on the empirical study, Brander and 
Poitevin (1992) suggest that managerial compensation contracts, as a means of aligning the 
interests of owners and manager, can also mitigate the agency conflict between shareholders 
and creditors. However, Brau (2002) has an opposite view by implying that solutions to 
owner-manager conflicts do not significant alleviate the creditor-shareholder conflicts on small 
business lending. Our study contributes to the new venture financing literature by confirming 
the Brander and Poitevin’s (1992) view. Third, our findings also provide important implications 
for new ventures, potential investors, and researchers. New ventures that are professionalized 
are more likely to successfully raise capital through debt financing. For potential investors, 
understanding professionalization as a signal can help them make financing decisions. This 
study also helps academics better understand the role of professionalization, which can lead to 
further research in this field.   
Our study is subject to several limitations. First, the data set contains a small portion of 
unusable values, such as 25+, to indicate the highest value of a certain variable. To ensure the 
accuracy, we cannot change 25+ to a continuous variable 25, and therefore treat them as 
missing values. The second limitation is that all financial variables are in ordinal forms, which 
prevent the construction to other variables, such as ratios or sums. The third limitation is that 
we cannot tell whether the debt financing variables employed in our study are interpreted from 
the supply side or from the demand side. As a consequence, we have to take both sides into 
consideration for the analysis. The fourth limitation is that our data set does not contain any 
information about the cost of debt. According to the economic theory, the price and the quantity 
should be determined simultaneously. The use of debt in our study is equivalent to the quantity; 
however, the unavailability of the information about the cost not only prevents us from 
measuring the price but also leads to a potential omitted variable issue. Even though it is 
generally accepted that using panel data may help resolve this issue, it may not provide us with 
a clearer picture of the equilibrium. Last, none of variables in our data set can be used as a 
proxy for geographical regions, and therefore, we cannot take into account the effects of 
different bankrupt laws and regulations in different states on debt financing.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
The dependent variables used in our study are Business Bank Loan, Business Loan, Total Debt, and Total 
Business Debt, which indicates whether the business mainly focuses on a commercial bank as a source of 
financing, whether the business obtains debt from either a commercial bank or a non-bank financial 
institution, the total amount of business loans and personal loans for business-related purposes, and the total 
amount of business loans due to business-related purposes, respectively.  
 
Incentive plan as the only independent variable measures whether the business offers a compensation plan in 
any forms among bonus plans, vacation paid plans, or stock option plans. 
 
In terms of the firm characteristics, the continuous variables HR, Sales, R&D, and Finance capture the 
percentage of employees or owners who are responsible for human resources, sales, research & development, 
and the financial administrative, respectively. The variable Personnel measures how many persons are 
responsible for all the above areas together. Firm size is measured by the Total Assets. Three dummy 
variables are used to represent a firm that is owned and managed by the same person (Sole Owner), a legal 
entity separates from their owners that may engage in own rights and liabilities (Corporation), and a type of 
business in which two or more owners share the profits or losses (Partnership). Industry sectors are divided 
into eight categories and presented by seven dummy variables based on the North American Industry 
Classification System. The owner’s characteristic as the other control variables include owner’s work 
experience (Work Exp), educational level measured by three dummy variables (High School, Post Secondary, 
and Post Graduate), whether majorities of owners are member of visible minorities (Minority), whether the 
firm is owned by male (Male), and the owner’s age (Age Owner).  
 
The above variables are used repetitively in the pooled sample using all four surveys and all four subsamples 
based on each survey. Panel A shows the summary statistics of the pooled sample. Panel B shows the 
descriptive statistics of the Baseline Survey (Year 2004), the First Follow-up (Year 2005), the Second 
Follow-up (Year 2006), and the Third Follow-up (Year 2007), respectively.  
 
Panel C shows the means and the percentages of increasing/decreasing/no changing cases for the change in 
major variables used in our study. The changes occur between the First Follow-up and the Baseline Survey, 
between the Second Follow-up and the First Follow-up, between the Third Follow-up and the Second 
Follow-up, and within the pooled sample.  
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Panel A. Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Used in the Pooled Sample  
 
Variable  Mean S. D. Min Max N 
Dependent Variables 
Business Bank Loan  0.065 0.246 0 1 15168 
Business Loan  0.078 0.269 0 1 15201 
Total Debt  2.995  3.173 0 9 15271 
Total Business Debt  1.481 2.681 0 9 15241 
Independent Variable 
Stock Option 0.081 0.272 0 1 10591 
Bonus Plan 0.242 0.428 0 1 10589 
Paid Vacation  0.364 0.481 0 1 10587 
Incentive Plan  0.453 0.498 0 1 10599 
Firm Characteristics 
HR  0.201 0.267 0 1 9932 
Sales 0.322 0.300 0 1 9714 
R&D 0.262 0.301 0 1 9837 
Finance  0.307 0.284 0 1 9928 
Personnel  1.105 0.972 0 4 9592 
Total Assets  5.752 2.548 0 9 15210 
Sole Owner 0.317 0.465 0 1 15366 
Corporation  0.311 0.463 0 1 15366 
Partnership 0.045 0.207 0 1 15366 
Firm Owner Attributes 
Work Exp 13.250 9.886 0 39 14622 
High School 0.085 0.280 0 1 15247 
Post Secondary 0.587 0.492 0 1 15247 
Post Graduate 0.311 0.463 0 1 15247 
Minority 0.137 0.344 0 1 15234 
Male 0.798 0.402 0 1 15281 
Age Owner  3.705 1.122 1 7 15256 
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Panel B. Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Used in the Four Subsamples 
 
 Baseline Survey First Follow-up Second Follow-up Third Follow-up 
Variable Mean S. D. N Mean S. D. N Mean S. D. N Mean S. D. N 
Dependent Variables 
Business Bank Loan  0.067 0.250 4889 0.061 0.240 3968 0.061 0.240  3392 0.069 0.254 2919 
Business Loan  0.082 0.274 4895 0.074 0.262 3980 0.073 0.260 3402 0.085 0.279 2924 
Total Debt  2.993 3.150 4919 2.977 3.162 3995 3.086 3.206 3419   2.919 3.189 2938 
Total Business Debt  1.318 2.583 4916 1.514 2.681 3988 1.603 2.753  3406 1.566 2.747 2931 
Independent Variable 
Stock Option 0.088 0.284 3051 0.085 0.279 2923 0.073 0.260 2572 0.073 0.260 2045 
Bonus Plan 0.191 0.393 3053 0.246 0.431 2917 0.269 0.443 2573 0.281 0.449 2046 
Paid Vacation  0.292 0.455 3049 0.365 0.482 2922 0.395 0.489 2571 0.429 0.495 2045 
Incentive Plan 0.397 0.489 3053 0.456 0.498 2923 0.472 0.499 2576 0.506 0.500 2047 
Firm Characteristics 
HR  0.273 0.315 2892 0.172 0.239 2755 0.173 0.237 2371 0.170 0.236 1914 
Sales 0.384 0.328 2836 0.302 0.284 2690 0.289 0.281 2328 0.297 0.284 1860 
R&D 0.340 0.334 2876 0.239 0.280 2726 0.227 0.276 2348 0.220 0.282 1887 
Finance  0.379 0.311 2886 0.281 0.269 2753 0.274 0.260 2377 0.277 0.272 1912 
Personnel 1.392 1.082 2817 0.996 0.897 2649 0.979 0.890 2289 0.978 0.900 1837 
Total Assets  5.241 2.692 4915 5.910 2.425 3994 6.046 2.432 3385 6.057 2.462 2916 
Sole Owner 0.332 0.471 4928 0.318 0.466 3998 0.303 0.460 3469 0.307 0.461 2971 
Corporation  0.301 0.459 4928 0.308 0.462 3998 0.319 0.466 3469 0.325 0.469 2971 
Partnership 0.050 0.217 4928 0.046 0.210 3998 0.042 0.201 3469 0.039 0.195 2971 
Firm Owner Attributes 
Work Exp 12.880 9.853 4739 13.264 9.937 3829 13.464 9.870 3258 13.612 9.876 2796 
High School 0.088 0.284 4918 0.082 0.274 3996 0.084 0.277 3420 0.088 0.284 2913 
Post Secondary 0.592 0.492 4918 0.584 0.493 3996 0.580 0.494 3420 0.595 0.491 2913 
Post Graduate 0.302 0.459 4918 0.318 0.466 3996 0.324 0.468 3420 0.302 0.459 2913 
Minority 0.148 0.355 4884 0.134 0.340 3991 0.133 0.340 3418 0.128 0.334 2941 
Male 0.792 0.406 4921 0.794 0.404 3998 0.804 0.397 3421 0.805 0.396 2941 
Age Owner  3.653 1.122 4904 3.713 1.122 3993 3.723 1.121 3418 3.758 1.123 2941 
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Panel C. Descriptive Statistics of the Changes in Variables 
 
 The First Follow-up 
minus the Baseline 
Survey 
The Second Follow-up 
minus the First Follow-up 
The Third Follow-up 
minus the Second 
Follow-up 
Change in the Pooled 
Sample 
Variable Mean % N Mean % N Mean % N Mean % N 
Dependent Variables 
Business Bank Loan↑ 1 0.038 149 1 0.039 126 1 0.043 118 1 0.040 393 
Business Bank Loan↓ -1 0.042 167 -1 0.036 117 -1 0.034 94 -1 0.038 378 
Business Bank Loan = 0 0.920 3624 0 0.926 3019 0 0.922 2513 0 0.922 9156 
 
Business Loan ↑ 1 0.047 185 1 0.047 153 1 0.053 145 1 0.048 483 
Business Loan ↓ -1 0.054 212 -1 0.045 149 -1 0.041 112 -1 0.047 473 
Business Bank Loan = 0 0.900 3558 0 0.908 2978 0 0.906 2478 0 0.904 9014 
 
Total Debt↑ 3.490 0.277 1105 3.347 0.277 914 3.182 0.238 655 3.366 0.266 2674 
Total Debt↓ -3.505 0.286 1142 -3.347 0.243 802 -3.416 0.250 688 -3.434 0.262 2632 
Total Debt= 0 0.437 1742 0 0.481 1588 0 0.513 1414 0 0.472 4744 
 
Total Business Debt↑ 4.285 0.192 765 4.145 0.192 633 4.263 0.176 483 4.232 0.188 1881 
Total Business Debt↓ -4.172 0.152 605 -4.345 0.163 537 -4.255 0.177 486 -4.254 0.163 1628 
Total Business Debt = 0 0.656 2611 0 0.644 2119 0 0.647 1776 0 0.650 6506 
Independent Variable 
Incentive plan↑ 1 0.148 331 1 0.089 194 1 0.086 153 1 0.110 678 
Incentive plan↓ -1 0.068 151 -1 0.078 170 -1 0.073 130 -1 0.073 451 
Incentive plan = 0 0.784 1749 0 0.832 1806 0 0.840 1487 0 0.817 5042 
Control Variable 
Total Assets↑ 2.502 0.409 1632 2.063 0.288 942 2.093 0.253 690 2.289 0.327 3264 
Total Assets↓ -2.291 0.194 774 -2.194 0.238 777 -2.206 0.235 642 -2.232 0.220 2193 
Total Assets= 0 0.397 1581 0 0.474 1552 0 0.512 1396 0 0.454 4529 
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Panel D. T-Test for Differences between Mean Values 
Panel D shows the results for testing differences between mean values of the dependent variables, the 
independent variables, and some of the major control variables in all possible time intervals. The two-tailed 
paired t-test is employed in the analysis and the hypothesis testing is as follows:  
Ho: mean difference =0 
Ha: mean difference ≠0 
 
Level of significance: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1 
Mean Difference 
 The First 
follow-up 
minus the 
Baseline 
The Second 
follow-up 
minus the 
Baseline 
The Third 
follow-up 
minus the 
Baseline 
The Second 
follow-up 
minus the 
First 
follow-up 
The Third 
follow-up 
minus the 
First 
follow-up 
The Third 
follow-up 
minus the 
Second 
Follow-up 
Business Bank Loan  -0.005 -0.002 0.007 0.003 0.008 0.009* 
Business Loan  -0.007 -0.006 0.008 0.001 0.010 0.012** 
Total Debt  -0.037 0.106* -0.020 0.113** 0.026 -0.096* 
Total Business Debt  0.189*** 0.310*** 0.282*** 0.088* 0.060 -0.003 
Stock Option 0.001 -0.014* -0.013* -0.015** -0.010 0.002 
Bonus Plan 0.062*** 0.098*** 0.097*** 0.025*** 0.025** -0.004 
Paid Vacation  0.100*** 0.132*** 0.160*** 0.024*** 0.048*** 0.020** 
Incentive Plan 0.081*** 0.104*** 0.121*** 0.011 0.030*** 0.013 
HR  -0.093*** -0.093*** -0.103*** 0.001 -0.001 -0.006 
Sales -0.078*** -0.086*** -0.075*** -0.014* -0.005 0.009 
R&D -0.101*** -0.103*** -0.108*** -0.016** -0.023*** -0.009 
Finance  -0.091*** -0.092*** -0.089*** -0.010 -0.005 0.002 
Personnel -0.370*** -0.377*** -0.378*** -0.034 -0.019 -0.004 
Total Assets  0.579*** 0.685*** 0.716*** 0.073** 0.085** 0.010 
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Table 2. Univariate Analysis 
 
Based on the pooled sample using all four surveys, column two to five of Table 2 show the pairwise 
correlation coefficients between each dependent variable and the individual explanatory variables used 
in this study. The pairwise correlation coefficients between the independent variable and the control 
variables are presented in column six of Table 2.  
 
 Business 
Bank Loan 
Business 
Loan 
Total Debt Total Business 
Debt 
Incentive 
Plan 
Stock Option 0.007 0.031*** 0.009 0.035*** 0.326*** 
Bonus Plan 0.092*** 0.107*** 0.115*** 0.147*** 0.621*** 
Paid Vacation 0.142*** 0.160*** 0.192*** 0.227*** 0.831*** 
Incentive Plan 0.129*** 0.151*** 0.181*** 0.206*** 1 
HR -0.016 -0.015 -0.009 -0.046*** -0.041*** 
Sales -0.038*** -0.044*** -0.032*** -0.063*** -0.116*** 
R&D -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.058*** -0.093*** -0.123*** 
Finance -0.043*** -0.051*** -0.072*** -0.104*** -0.195*** 
Personnel -0.044*** -0.047*** -0.050*** -0.088*** -0.137*** 
Total Assets 0.176*** 0.187*** 0.340*** 0.296*** 0.325*** 
Sole Owner -0.096*** -0.098*** -0.146*** -0.157*** -0.207*** 
Corporation 0.076*** 0.080*** 0.137*** 0.146*** 0.245*** 
Partnership 0.003 0.008 -0.007 -0.004 -0.079*** 
Work Exp 0.006 0.017** -0.031*** 0.031*** 0.139*** 
High School 0.018** 0.014* -0.008 -0.018** -0.050*** 
Post Secondary -0.009 -0.017** 0.008 -0.010 -0.048*** 
Post Graduate -0.004 0.005 -0.008 0.018** 0.081*** 
Minority -0.036*** -0.043*** -0.026*** -0.041*** -0.045*** 
Male 0.051*** 0.059*** 0.079*** 0.091*** 0.132*** 
Age Owner 0.006 0.012 -0.009 0.016* 0.001 
Level of significance: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1 
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Table 3. The Effects of Professionalization on New Venture Debt Financing (Baseline Model) 
 
Results presented in this table are based on Model 1. The dependent variables in Model 1 are Business 
Bank Loan, Business Loan, Total Debt, and Total Business Debt, which indicates whether the business 
uses debt only from a commercial bank; or from either a commercial bank or a non-bank financial 
institution, the total amount of debt in terms of both business loans and personal loans, and the total 
amount of business loans only, respectively.  
 
The results based on the former two dependent variables (Business Bank Loan, Business Loan) are 
shown in Panel A. Model 1 is estimated repetitively using one year full sample data (the Third 
Follow-up) as well as the pooled full sample data using all four surveys. Logit models are employed for 
these two versions model analysis.   
 
The results based on the later two dependent variables (Total Debt and Total Business Debt) are 
presented in Panel B. Again, Model 1 is estimated repetitively using one year full sample data (the 
Third Follow-up) as well as the pooled full sample data using all four surveys. Ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regressions are used since we treat these two ordinal dependent variables as continuous variables.  
 
The results based on the former two dependent variables (Business Bank Loan, Business Loan) are 
shown in Panel C. Model 1 is estimated repetitively using one year sub-sample data (the Third 
Follow-up) as well as the pooled sub-sample data using all four surveys by excluding all the sole 
proprietorship cases. Logit models are used since both dependent variables are dummy variables.  
 
The results based on the later two dependent variables (Total Debt and Total Business Debt) are 
presented in Panel D. Again, Model 1 is estimated repetitively using one year sub-sample data (the third 
Follow-up) as well as the pooled sub-sample data using all four surveys by excluding all the sole 
proprietorship cases. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions are used since we treat these two ordinal 
dependent variables as continuous variables.  
 
For the later two dependent variable Total Debt and Total Business Debt, one-sided tobit models are 
adopted because they are censored at zero. The results are presented in Panel E. Again, Model 1 is 
estimated repetitively using one year full sample data (the Third Follow-up) as well as the pooled full 
sample data using all four surveys.   
 
As Panel E, Panel F shows the corresponding results based on the sub-sample data by excluding all the 
sole proprietorship cases. 
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Panel A. The Effects of Professionalization on the Use of Debt (Full Sample): Logit Models 
 Third Follow-up  Pooled Sample Using All Four Surveys  
Dep. Var. Business Bank Loan Business Loan Business Bank Loan Business Loan 
Incentive Plan 0.773*** 
(3.490) 
0.799*** 
(3.650) 
0.880*** 
(4.300) 
0.882*** 
(4.390) 
0.382*** 
(4.150) 
0.398*** 
(4.360) 
0.495*** 
(5.790) 
0.514*** 
(6.060) 
Personnel 
 
 -0.260** 
(-2.050) 
 -0.182 
(-1.640) 
 -0.142*** 
(-2.910) 
 -0.141*** 
(-3.130) 
HR 0.233 
(0.380) 
 0.202 
(0.360) 
 0.080 
(0.360) 
 0.207 
(0.990) 
 
Sales -0.466 
(-0.860) 
 -0.376 
(-0.770) 
 -0.118 
(-0.530) 
 -0.195 
(-0.940) 
 
R&D 0.037 
(0.070) 
 0.011 
(0.020) 
 -0.464** 
(-2.100) 
 -0.361* 
(-1.760) 
 
Finance -0.699 
(-1.160) 
 -0.526 
(-0.980) 
 -0.030 
(-0.130) 
 -0.175 
(-0.790) 
 
Total Assets 0.245*** 
(3.330) 
0.246*** 
(3.340) 
0.240*** 
(3.640) 
0.241*** 
(3.680) 
0.400*** 
(11.210) 
0.402*** 
(11.290) 
0.370*** 
(11.730) 
0.372*** 
(11.830) 
Sole Owner -0.689** 
(-2.140) 
-0.681** 
(-2.130) 
-0.523* 
(-1.830) 
-0.536* 
(-1.890) 
-0.518*** 
(-3.660) 
-0.512*** 
(-3.630) 
-0.443*** 
(-3.440) 
-0.438*** 
(-3.410) 
Corporation -0.156 
(-0.750) 
-0.154 
(-0.740) 
-0.147 
(-0.760) 
-0.162 
(-0.840) 
0.068 
(0.720) 
0.064 
(0.690) 
0.049 
(0.560) 
0.045 
(0.530) 
Partnership 0.163 
(0.350) 
0.133 
(0.290) 
0.264 
(0.640) 
0.204 
(0.490) 
-0.073 
(-0.390) 
-0.084 
(-0.450) 
-0.004 
(-0.020) 
-0.019 
(-0.110) 
Work Exp -0.013 
(-1.200) 
-0.012 
(-1.150) 
-0.012 
(-1.240) 
-0.013 
(-1.330) 
-0.008* 
(-1.730) 
-0.007 
(-1.640) 
-0.004 
(-1.050) 
-0.004 
(-0.990) 
High School -0.294 
(-0.410) 
-0.269 
(-0.380) 
-1.039* 
(-1.800) 
-1.022* 
(-1.770) 
-0.202 
(-0.680) 
-0.206 
(-0.700) 
-0.349 
(-1.270) 
-0.346 
(-1.260) 
Post Secondary -0.454 
(-0.690) 
-0.444 
(-0.670) 
-1.249** 
(-2.400) 
-1.231** 
(-2.370) 
-0.707*** 
(-2.590) 
-0.717*** 
(-2.640) 
-0.793*** 
(-3.140) 
-0.794*** 
(-3.150) 
Post Graduate -0.999 
(-1.450) 
-0.989 
(-1.440) 
-1.431*** 
(-2.630) 
-1.429*** 
(-2.640) 
-0.923*** 
(-3.270) 
-0.933*** 
(-3.320) 
-0.883*** 
(-3.390) 
-0.887*** 
(-3.410) 
Minority -0.219 
(-0.690) 
-0.189 
(-0.600) 
-0.325 
(-1.100) 
-0.223 
(-0.770) 
-0.347** 
(-2.360) 
-0.351** 
(-2.390) 
-0.404*** 
(-2.940) 
-0.384*** 
(-2.820) 
Male 0.606* 
(1.730) 
0.617* 
(1.760) 
0.569* 
(1.830) 
0.597* 
(1.920) 
0.081 
(0.620) 
0.081 
(0.620) 
0.054 
(0.450) 
0.058 
(0.490) 
Age Owner -0.042 
(-0.430) 
-0.056 
(-0.580) 
-0.036 
(-0.410) 
-0.036 
(-0.400) 
-0.072* 
(-1.690) 
-0.075* 
(-1.760) 
-0.062 
(-1.570) 
-0.065* 
(-1.650) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  --- --- --- --- Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -4.136*** 
(-4.180) 
-4.170*** 
(-4.220) 
-3.296*** 
(-3.970) 
-3.381*** 
(-4.090) 
-4.585*** 
(-10.610) 
-4.586*** 
(-10.650) 
-4.186*** 
(-10.670) 
-4.218*** 
(-10.790) 
N 1713 1726 1717 1730 9006 9052 9032 9078 
LR value 97.860*** 97.500*** 109.170*** 107.040*** 479.850*** 479.340*** 549.080*** 547.020*** 
Pseudo R2 0.103 0.102 0.100 0.097 0.100 0.099 0.100 0.100 
Level of significance: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1 
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Panel B. The Effects of Professionalization on the Amount of Debt (Full Sample): OLS Regressions 
 Third Follow-up  Pooled Sample Using All Four Surveys  
Dep. Var. Total Debt Total Business Debt Total Debt Total Business Debt 
Incentive Plan 0.810*** 
(4.890) 
0.858*** 
(5.250) 
0.877*** 
(5.890) 
0.911*** 
(6.230) 
0.465*** 
(6.530) 
0.498*** 
(7.060) 
0.483*** 
(7.620) 
0.507*** 
(8.080) 
Personnel   -0.104 
(-1.270) 
 -0.247*** 
(-3.360) 
 -0.103*** 
(-3.080) 
 -0.199*** 
(-6.660) 
HR  0.071 
(0.180) 
 -0.249 
(-0.690) 
 0.173 
(1.120) 
 -0.017 
(-0.120) 
 
Sales 0.171 
(0.460) 
 0.474 
(1.440) 
 0.279* 
(1.770) 
 0.176 
(1.250) 
 
R&D 0.414 
(1.110) 
 -0.320 
(-0.960) 
 -0.252 
(-1.630) 
 -0.443*** 
(-3.220) 
 
Finance  -1.071*** 
(-2.750) 
 -0.909*** 
(-2.600) 
 -0.586*** 
(-3.500) 
 -0.511*** 
(-3.430) 
 
Total Assets  0.342*** 
(9.810) 
0.339*** 
(9.780) 
0.217*** 
(6.910) 
0.213*** 
(6.830) 
0.375*** 
(26.260) 
0.376*** 
(26.450) 
0.245*** 
(19.250) 
0.246*** 
(19.420) 
Sole Owner 0.001 
(0.010) 
-0.012 
(-0.060) 
-0.295 
(-1.540) 
-0.315* 
(-1.650) 
-0.319*** 
(-3.470) 
-0.311*** 
(-3.390) 
-0.343*** 
(-4.180) 
-0.345*** 
(-4.230) 
Corporation  0.234 
(1.340) 
0.209 
(1.200) 
0.192 
(1.220) 
0.167 
(1.070) 
0.209*** 
(2.750) 
0.200*** 
(2.640) 
0.230*** 
(3.400) 
0.222*** 
(3.300) 
Partnership -0.251 
(-0.720) 
-0.324 
(-0.940) 
0.070 
(0.220) 
0.005 
(0.020) 
-0.341** 
(-2.450) 
-0.367*** 
(-2.660) 
-0.178 
(-1.440) 
-0.200 
(-1.630) 
Work Exp -0.017** 
(-2.070) 
-0.017** 
(-2.090) 
-0.001 
(-0.100) 
-0.002 
(-0.250) 
-0.018*** 
(-5.140) 
-0.018*** 
(-5.130) 
-0.002 
(-0.790) 
-0.002 
(-0.770) 
High School -0.893 
(-1.380) 
-0.841 
(-1.300) 
-1.494** 
(-2.580) 
-1.426** 
(-2.470) 
-0.155 
(-0.540) 
-0.134 
(-0.460) 
-0.631** 
(-2.460) 
-0.616** 
(-2.400) 
Post Secondary -0.846 
(-1.410) 
-0.794 
(-1.330) 
-1.011* 
(-1.880) 
-0.938* 
(-1.750) 
-0.208 
(-0.780) 
-0.182 
(-0.680) 
-0.613** 
(-2.580) 
-0.596** 
(-2.510) 
Post Graduate -0.945 
(-1.540) 
-0.857 
(-1.400) 
-1.280** 
(-2.330) 
-1.171** 
(-2.140) 
-0.408 
(-1.500) 
-0.383 
(-1.410) 
-0.735*** 
(-3.030) 
-0.721*** 
(-2.980) 
Minority -0.254 
(-1.160) 
-0.234 
(-1.070) 
-0.058 
(-0.300) 
-0.056 
(-0.290) 
-0.016 
(-0.170) 
-0.014 
(-0.150) 
-0.127 
(-1.510) 
-0.128 
(-1.520) 
Male -0.078 
(-0.370) 
-0.110 
(-0.530) 
0.250 
(1.330) 
0.216 
(1.160) 
-0.079 
(-0.890) 
-0.083 
(-0.940) 
0.007 
(0.080) 
0.001 
(0.010) 
Age Owner  -0.027 
(-0.360) 
-0.030 
(-0.410) 
-0.069 
(-1.030) 
-0.062 
(-0.930) 
-0.052 
(-1.600) 
-0.055* 
(-1.720) 
-0.067** 
(-2.330) 
-0.068** 
(-2.360) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  --- --- --- --- Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  1.776** 
(2.420) 
1.698** 
(2.320) 
1.241* 
(1.890) 
1.202* 
(1.830) 
1.229*** 
(3.770) 
1.188*** 
(3.650) 
0.882*** 
(3.040) 
0.856*** 
(2.960) 
N 1724 1737 1721 1734 9055 9101 9047 9093 
F-value 11.990*** 13.510*** 9.830*** 11.030*** 54.180*** 60.790*** 38.890*** 43.580*** 
Adj R-squared 0.128 0.126 0.106 0.104 0.133 0.131 0.098 0.097 
Level of significance: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1 
57 
 
Panel C. The Effects of Professionalization on the Use of Debt (Sub-Samples): Logit Models 
 Third Follow-up  Pooled Sample Using All Four Surveys  
Dep. Var. Business Bank Loan Business Loan Business Bank Loan Business Loan 
Incentive Plan 0.781*** 
(3.260) 
0.805*** 
(3.400) 
0.928*** 
(4.120) 
0.923*** 
(4.190) 
0.336*** 
(3.410) 
0.349*** 
(3.580) 
0.471*** 
(5.110) 
0.487*** 
(5.340) 
Personnel  -0.314** 
(-2.260) 
 -0.206* 
(-1.710) 
 -0.147*** 
(-2.870) 
 -0.135*** 
(-2.840) 
HR  -0.048 
(-0.070) 
 -0.012 
(-0.020) 
 -0.036 
(-0.150) 
 0.106 
(0.480) 
 
Sales -0.419 
(-0.720) 
 -0.322 
(-0.620) 
 -0.064 
(-0.270) 
 -0.124 
(-0.570) 
 
R&D 0.065 
(0.110) 
 -0.041 
(-0.080) 
 -0.466** 
(-2.020) 
 -0.384* 
(-1.790) 
 
Finance  -0.759 
(-1.170) 
 -0.461 
(-0.800) 
 -0.006 
(-0.020) 
 -0.112 
(-0.480) 
 
Total Assets  0.251*** 
(3.070) 
0.251*** 
(3.070) 
0.234*** 
(3.200) 
0.236*** 
(3.240) 
0.389*** 
(10.150) 
0.391*** 
(10.210) 
0.358*** 
(10.510) 
0.360*** 
(10.600) 
Sole Owner Dropped 
Corporation  -0.157 
(-0.750) 
-0.159 
(-0.770) 
-0.144 
(-0.750) 
-0.160 
(-0.840) 
0.078 
(0.840) 
0.073 
(0.780) 
0.057 
(0.660) 
0.052 
(0.600) 
Partnership 0.162 
(0.350) 
0.146 
(0.310) 
0.284 
(0.680) 
0.234 
(0.570) 
-0.071 
(-0.370) 
-0.084 
(-0.450) 
-0.001 
(-0.010) 
-0.018 
(-0.110) 
Work Exp -0.021* 
(-1.830) 
-0.020* 
(-1.820) 
-0.019* 
(-1.840) 
-0.020** 
(-1.980) 
-0.013*** 
(-2.710) 
-0.013*** 
(-2.680) 
-0.010** 
(-2.170) 
-0.010** 
(-2.160) 
High School -0.276 
(-0.310) 
-0.232 
(-0.260) 
-0.749 
(-0.950) 
-0.716 
(-0.910) 
-0.131 
(-0.370) 
-0.141 
(-0.410) 
-0.238 
(-0.710) 
-0.245 
(-0.740) 
Post Secondary -0.568 
(-0.680) 
-0.531 
(-0.640) 
-1.055 
(-1.430) 
-1.016 
(-1.380) 
-0.656** 
(-2.020) 
-0.674** 
(-2.080) 
-0.693** 
(-2.250) 
-0.704** 
(-2.290) 
Post Graduate -1.137 
(-1.330) 
-1.097 
(-1.280) 
-1.230 
(-1.640) 
-1.208 
(-1.610) 
-0.869*** 
(-2.620) 
-0.884*** 
(-2.670) 
-0.782** 
(-2.490) 
-0.796** 
(-2.540) 
Minority -0.169 
(-0.490) 
-0.146 
(-0.430) 
-0.187 
(-0.590) 
-0.082 
(-0.270) 
-0.461*** 
(-2.760) 
-0.470*** 
(-2.810) 
-0.545*** 
(-3.440) 
-0.525*** 
(-3.340) 
Male 0.551 
(1.410) 
0.559 
(1.430) 
0.505 
(1.430) 
0.536 
(1.520) 
0.105 
(0.720) 
0.105 
(0.720) 
0.066 
(0.490) 
0.071 
(0.520) 
Age Owner  -0.021 
(-0.210) 
-0.035 
(-0.340) 
-0.002 
(-0.020) 
0.003 
(0.040) 
-0.053 
(-1.170) 
-0.053 
(-1.190) 
-0.047 
(-1.110) 
-0.048 
(-1.140) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  --- --- --- --- Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  -3.851*** 
(-3.270) 
-3.893*** 
(-3.320) 
-3.352*** 
(-3.200) 
-3.452*** 
(-3.330) 
-4.498*** 
(-9.280) 
-4.478*** 
(-9.280) 
-4.155*** 
(-9.290) 
-4.164*** 
(-9.350) 
N 1343 1352 1346 1355 7105 7146 7128 7169 
LR value 75.430*** 
 
75.380*** 78.270*** 76.620*** 357.610*** 357.680*** 404.720*** 403.650*** 
Pseudo R2 0.092 0.092 0.085 0.082 0.087 0.087 0.087 0.087 
Level of significance: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1 
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Panel D. The Effects of Professionalization on the Amount of Debt (Sub-Samples): OLS Regressions 
 Third Follow-up  Pooled Sample Using All Four Surveys  
Dep. Var. Total Debt Total Business Debt Total Debt Total Business Debt 
Incentive Plan 0.978*** 
(5.140) 
1.040*** 
(5.550) 
0.945*** 
(5.390) 
0.990*** 
(5.750) 
0.416*** 
(5.140) 
0.455*** 
(5.680) 
0.455*** 
(6.180) 
0.481*** 
(6.620) 
Personnel   -0.131 
(-1.440) 
 -0.255*** 
(-3.050) 
 -0.139*** 
(-3.690) 
 -0.214*** 
(-6.280) 
HR  0.202 
(0.440) 
 -0.252 
(-0.600) 
 0.128 
(0.740) 
 -0.066 
(-0.420) 
 
Sales 0.075 
(0.180) 
 0.648* 
(1.650) 
 0.291 
(1.620) 
 0.220 
(1.340) 
 
R&D 0.357 
(0.850) 
 -0.458 
(-1.190) 
 -0.261 
(-1.510) 
 -0.490*** 
(-3.110) 
 
Finance  -1.135** 
(-2.570) 
 -0.992** 
(-2.450) 
 -0.690*** 
(-3.640) 
 -0.531*** 
(-3.090) 
 
Total Assets  0.314*** 
(7.580) 
0.313*** 
(7.590) 
0.232*** 
(6.050) 
0.228*** 
(5.990) 
0.369*** 
(21.940) 
0.371*** 
(22.090) 
0.262*** 
(17.090) 
0.263*** 
(17.250) 
Sole Owner Dropped 
Corporation  0.187 
(1.040) 
0.161 
(0.900) 
0.168 
(1.020) 
0.141 
(0.860) 
0.215*** 
(2.750) 
0.204*** 
(2.610) 
0.229*** 
(3.210) 
0.219*** 
(3.100) 
Partnership -0.216 
(-0.600) 
-0.290 
(-0.820) 
0.114 
(0.350) 
0.048 
(0.150) 
-0.362** 
(-2.530) 
-0.389*** 
(-2.740) 
-0.180 
(-1.390) 
-0.204 
(-1.580) 
Work Exp -0.022** 
(-2.360) 
-0.023** 
(-2.420) 
-0.001 
(-0.070) 
-0.002 
(-0.260) 
-0.022*** 
(-5.310) 
-0.021*** 
(-5.320) 
-0.003 
(-0.710) 
-0.003 
(-0.720) 
High School -0.580 
(-0.590) 
-0.461 
(-0.470) 
-1.592* 
(-1.750) 
-1.521* 
(-1.670) 
-0.255 
(-0.640) 
-0.255 
(-0.640) 
-0.766** 
(-2.120) 
-0.765** 
(-2.120) 
Post Secondary -0.369 
(-0.390) 
-0.261 
(-0.280) 
-0.902 
(-1.040) 
-0.817 
(-0.940) 
-0.350 
(-0.940) 
-0.338 
(-0.910) 
-0.779** 
(-2.310) 
-0.772** 
(-2.290) 
Post Graduate -0.558 
(-0.590) 
-0.426 
(-0.450) 
-1.258 
(-1.440) 
-1.130 
(-1.300) 
-0.602 
(-1.600) 
-0.592 
(-1.580) 
-0.907*** 
(-2.660) 
-0.903*** 
(-2.650) 
Minority -0.285 
(-1.080) 
-0.248 
(-0.950) 
-0.066 
(-0.270) 
-0.062 
(-0.260) 
-0.155 
(-1.340) 
-0.150 
(-1.300) 
-0.263** 
(-2.500) 
-0.264** 
(-2.520) 
Male -0.023 
(-0.090) 
-0.062 
(-0.240) 
0.227 
(0.940) 
0.169 
(0.700) 
-0.059 
(-0.530) 
-0.067 
(-0.600) 
0.007 
(0.070) 
-0.008 
(-0.080) 
Age Owner  -0.021 
(-0.240) 
-0.027 
(-0.320) 
-0.073 
(-0.910) 
-0.062 
(-0.790) 
-0.051 
(-1.330) 
-0.054 
(-1.430) 
-0.081** 
(-2.370) 
-0.080** 
(-2.350) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  --- --- --- --- Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  1.479 
(1.380 
1.344 
(1.260) 
1.127 
(1.140) 
1.081 
(1.100) 
1.465*** 
(3.410) 
1.437*** 
(3.350) 
1.022*** 
(2.620) 
1.010*** 
(2.600) 
N 1363 1373 1361 1371 7145 7186 7139 7180 
F-value 9.850*** 11.180*** 7.780*** 8.640*** 40.160*** 45.290*** 29.620*** 33.330*** 
Adj R-squared 0.125 0.124 0.099 0.096 0.121 0.119 0.091 0.090 
Level of significance: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1 
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Panel E. The Effects of Professionalization on the Amount of Debt (Full Sample): Tobit Models 
 Third Follow-up  Pooled Sample Using All Four Surveys  
Dep. Var. Total Debt Total Business Debt Total Debt Total Business Debt 
Incentive Plan 1.248*** 
(4.410) 
1.315*** 
(4.720) 
2.494*** 
(5.500) 
2.581*** 
(5.770) 
0.713*** 
(5.950) 
0.757*** 
(6.380) 
1.252*** 
(6.410) 
1.308*** 
(6.770) 
Personnel   -0.117 
(-0.820) 
 -0.735*** 
(-3.030) 
 -0.125** 
(-2.170) 
 -0.580*** 
(-5.910) 
HR  0.197 
(0.280) 
 -0.772 
(-0.640) 
 0.217 
(0.820) 
 -0.215 
(-0.480) 
 
Sales 0.206 
(0.320) 
 1.134 
(1.090) 
 0.444 
(1.630) 
 0.621 
(1.360) 
 
R&D 0.743 
(1.140) 
 -0.801 
(-0.740) 
 -0.309 
(-1.160) 
 -1.285*** 
(-2.860) 
 
Finance  -1.617** 
(-2.330) 
 -2.634** 
(-2.280) 
 -0.821*** 
(-2.840) 
 -1.492*** 
(-3.040) 
 
Total Assets  0.634*** 
(9.610) 
0.634*** 
(9.640) 
0.716*** 
(6.390) 
0.710*** 
(6.340) 
0.652*** 
(24.950) 
0.656*** 
(25.140) 
0.878*** 
(18.500) 
0.884*** 
(18.660) 
Sole Owner 0.241 
(0.650) 
0.232 
(0.630) 
-0.716 
(-1.170) 
-0.829 
(-1.360) 
-0.326** 
(-2.070) 
-0.314** 
(-1.990) 
-0.808*** 
(-3.040) 
-0.833*** 
(-3.150) 
Corporation  0.454 
(1.520) 
0.423 
(1.420) 
0.550 
(1.170) 
0.454 
(0.970) 
0.371*** 
(2.890) 
0.358*** 
(2.800) 
0.666*** 
(3.200) 
0.633*** 
(3.060) 
Partnership -0.499 
(-0.800) 
-0.622 
(-1.000) 
0.212 
(0.210) 
-0.050 
(-0.050) 
-0.494** 
(-2.050) 
-0.530** 
(-2.220) 
-0.668 
(-1.640) 
-0.720* 
(-1.780) 
Work Exp -0.035** 
(-2.440) 
-0.036** 
(-2.520) 
-0.013 
(-0.560) 
-0.017 
(-0.760) 
-0.033*** 
(-5.500) 
-0.033*** 
(-5.520) 
-0.013 
(-1.300) 
-0.013 
(-1.290) 
High School -1.579 
(-1.470) 
-1.492 
(-1.390) 
-4.838*** 
(-2.950) 
-4.718*** 
(-2.880) 
-0.393 
(-0.820) 
-0.356 
(-0.740) 
-2.168*** 
(-2.880) 
-2.136*** 
(-2.840) 
Post Secondary -1.601 
(-1.620) 
-1.533 
(-1.550) 
-3.336** 
(-2.260) 
-3.166** 
(-2.140) 
-0.468 
(-1.060) 
-0.427 
(-0.960) 
-1.988*** 
(-2.890) 
-1.948*** 
(-2.840) 
Post Graduate -1.745* 
(-1.720) 
-1.618 
(-1.600) 
-4.275*** 
(-2.810) 
-3.986*** 
(-2.620) 
-0.836* 
(-1.850) 
-0.798* 
(-1.770) 
-2.407*** 
(-3.420) 
-2.377*** 
(-3.390) 
Minority -0.535 
(-1.390) 
-0.502 
(-1.310) 
-0.137 
(-0.220) 
-0.090 
(-0.150) 
0.043 
(0.260) 
0.047 
(0.290) 
-0.324 
(-1.190) 
-0.312 
(-1.150) 
Male -0.155 
(-0.420) 
-0.225 
(-0.620) 
0.743 
(1.230) 
0.614 
(1.020) 
-0.167 
(-1.090) 
-0.178 
(-1.170) 
-0.151 
(-0.590) 
-0.177 
(-0.700) 
Age Owner  -0.053 
(-0.400) 
-0.052 
(-0.410) 
-0.264 
(-1.260) 
-0.232 
(-1.130) 
-0.117** 
(-2.130) 
-0.123** 
(-2.230) 
-0.303*** 
(-3.320) 
-0.305*** 
(-3.350) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  --- --- --- --- Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  -0.928 
(-0.750) 
-1.062 
(-0.860) 
-4.248** 
(-2.200) 
-4.376** 
(-2.280) 
-1.599*** 
(-2.910) 
-1.657*** 
(-3.020) 
-5.825*** 
(-6.590) 
-5.880*** 
(-6.670) 
N 1724 1737 1721 1734 9055 9101 9047 9093 
LR value 240.860*** 236.740*** 191.010*** 186.480*** 1193.750*** 1189.300*** 889.710*** 883.540*** 
Pseudo R2 0.033 0.032 0.039 0.038 0.031 0.031 0.035 0.035 
Level of significance: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1 
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Panel F. The Effects of Professionalization on the Amount of Debt (Sub-Samples): Tobit Models 
 Third Follow-up  Pooled Sample Using All Four Surveys  
Dep. Var. Total Debt Total Business Debt Total Debt Total Business Debt 
Incentive Plan 1.533*** 
(4.740) 
1.624*** 
(5.090) 
2.613*** 
(5.090) 
2.708*** 
(5.360) 
0.625*** 
(4.620) 
0.679*** 
(5.070) 
1.134*** 
(5.190) 
1.199*** 
(5.540) 
Personnel   -0.168 
(-1.050) 
 -0.785*** 
(-2.930) 
 -0.193*** 
(-3.010) 
 -0.645*** 
(-5.940) 
HR  0.416 
(0.520) 
 -0.888 
(-0.650) 
 0.136 
(0.460) 
 -0.356 
(-0.710) 
 
Sales -0.006 
(-0.010) 
 1.430 
(1.210) 
 0.478 
(1.560) 
 0.687 
(1.350) 
 
R&D 0.642 
(0.880) 
 -1.338 
(-1.130) 
 -0.344 
(-1.160) 
 -1.471*** 
(-2.980) 
 
Finance  -1.669** 
(-2.130) 
 -2.592** 
(-2.010) 
 -1.013*** 
(-3.120) 
 -1.532*** 
(-2.810) 
 
Total Assets  0.590*** 
(7.540) 
0.594*** 
(7.590) 
0.731*** 
(5.560) 
0.732*** 
(5.570) 
0.639*** 
(20.950) 
0.643*** 
(21.100) 
0.907*** 
(16.480) 
0.914*** 
(16.640) 
Sole Owner Dropped 
Corporation  0.380 
(1.250) 
0.348 
(1.140) 
0.514 
(1.080) 
0.416 
(0.880) 
0.387*** 
(2.960) 
0.370*** 
(2.830) 
0.702*** 
(3.310) 
0.664*** 
(3.150) 
Partnership -0.419 
(-0.660) 
-0.542 
(-0.860) 
0.303 
(0.300) 
0.046 
(0.050) 
-0.527** 
(-2.150) 
-0.566** 
(-2.320) 
-0.690* 
(-1.660) 
-0.746* 
(-1.810) 
Work Exp -0.044*** 
(-2.680) 
-0.045*** 
(-2.800) 
-0.014 
(-0.540) 
-0.021 
(-0.810) 
-0.038*** 
(-5.610) 
-0.038*** 
(-5.650) 
-0.015 
(-1.320) 
-0.015 
(-1.350) 
High School -0.872 
(-0.530) 
-0.672 
(-0.410) 
-4.138* 
(-1.670) 
-3.968 
(-1.600) 
-0.521 
(-0.810) 
-0.516 
(-0.800) 
-1.992** 
(-2.000) 
-2.001** 
(-2.010) 
Post Secondary -0.620 
(-0.390) 
-0.447 
(-0.280) 
-2.071 
(-0.890) 
-1.841 
(-0.790) 
-0.681 
(-1.130) 
-0.658 
(-1.100) 
-1.942** 
(-2.120) 
-1.925** 
(-2.100) 
Post Graduate -0.876 
(-0.550) 
-0.668 
(-0.420) 
-3.185 
(-1.360) 
-2.822 
(-1.200) 
-1.097* 
(-1.810) 
-1.078* 
(-1.770) 
-2.333** 
(-2.510) 
-2.326** 
(-2.510) 
Minority -0.567 
(-1.240) 
-0.502 
(-1.100) 
-0.258 
(-0.360) 
-0.199 
(-0.280) 
-0.241 
(-1.240) 
-0.231 
(-1.180) 
-0.788** 
(-2.420) 
-0.774** 
(-2.390) 
Male 0.057 
(0.130) 
-0.038 
(-0.080) 
0.664 
(0.900) 
0.468 
(0.640) 
-0.108 
(-0.570) 
-0.127 
(-0.680) 
-0.100 
(-0.320) 
-0.159 
(-0.520) 
Age Owner  -0.061 
(-0.410) 
-0.067 
(-0.450) 
-0.295 
(-1.250) 
-0.242 
(-1.040) 
-0.131** 
(-2.060) 
-0.137** 
(-2.160) 
-0.360*** 
(-3.460) 
-0.355*** 
(-3.430) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  --- --- --- --- Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  -1.742 
(-0.960) 
-1.979 
(-1.090) 
-5.280* 
(-1.920) 
-5.505** 
(-2.010) 
-1.204* 
(-1.710) 
-1.246* 
(-1.770) 
-5.846*** 
(-5.240) 
-5.861*** 
(-5.270) 
N 1363 1373 1361 1371 7145 7186 7139 7180 
LR value 194.030*** 190.890*** 149.790*** 144.480*** 884.330*** 880.590*** 688.780*** 682.460*** 
Pseudo R2 0.034 0.033 0.037 0.035 0.029 0.029 0.033 0.033 
Level of significance: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1 
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Table 4. The Effects of Professionalization on New Venture Debt Financing (Two-stage Model) 
 
Results presented in Panel A are based on Model 2.1. Incentive plan is a dummy dependent variable, 
whose value is one if the business offers compensation plans to its employees or owners, and zero 
otherwise. Therefore, the model is estimated using the probit model. Panel B and C of this table present 
the results of Models 2.2. In Panel B, probit models are used since Business Bank Loan and Business 
Loan are dummy dependent variables. In Panel C, Ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions are 
employed since we treat Total Debt and Total Business Debt as continuous variables. In short, the full 
sample data in the Third Follow-up and the pooled sample using all four surveys are used repetitively 
for estimating the coefficients on Model 2.1 and 2.2.  
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Panel A. The Effects of Personnel on the Use of Incentive Plan (The First Stage): Probit Models 
 
 Third Follow-up (Full Sample) Pooled Sample Using All Four Surveys 
(Full Sample) 
Dep. Var. Incentive Plan Incentive Plan 
Personnel   -0.133*** 
(-3.590) 
 -0.138*** 
(-9.080) 
HR  0.799*** 
(4.220) 
 0.554*** 
(7.660) 
 
Sales 0.200 
(1.190) 
 0.025 
(0.340) 
 
R&D -0.284 
(-1.630) 
 -0.176** 
(-2.450) 
 
Finance  -1.124*** 
(-6.150) 
 -0.870*** 
(-11.090) 
 
Total Assets  0.197*** 
(11.680) 
0.200*** 
(11.960) 
0.158*** 
(23.380) 
0.161*** 
(23.980) 
Sole Owner -0.121 
(-1.250) 
-0.092 
(-0.960) 
-0.318*** 
(-7.520) 
-0.304*** 
(-7.260) 
Corporation  0.455*** 
(5.910) 
0.472*** 
(6.230) 
0.413*** 
(12.480) 
0.424*** 
(12.950) 
Partnership -0.230 
(-1.410) 
-0.249 
(-1.570) 
-0.210*** 
(-3.220) 
-0.223*** 
(-3.470) 
Work Exp 0.017*** 
(4.680) 
0.019*** 
(5.140) 
0.017*** 
(10.450) 
0.017*** 
(11.080) 
High School 0.024 
(0.080) 
0.066 
(0.230) 
-0.005 
(-0.040) 
0.003 
(0.030) 
Post Secondary 0.041 
(0.150) 
0.097 
(0.370) 
0.077 
(0.630) 
0.097 
(0.810) 
Post Graduate 0.177 
(0.650) 
0.253 
(0.940) 
0.207* 
(1.680) 
0.225* 
(1.840) 
Minority -0.097 
(-0.970) 
-0.086 
(-0.870) 
0.012 
(0.290) 
0.022 
(0.510) 
Male 0.112 
(1.180) 
0.103 
(1.100) 
0.196*** 
(4.740) 
0.197*** 
(4.820) 
Age Owner  -0.116*** 
(-3.430) 
-0.129*** 
(-3.920) 
-0.113*** 
(-7.700) 
-0.124*** 
(-8.530) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  --- --- Yes Yes 
Constant  -1.407*** 
(-4.230) 
-1.502*** 
(-4.590) 
-1.158*** 
(-7.790) 
-1.215*** 
(-8.260) 
N 1725 1738 9059 9105 
LR value 436.410*** 394.540*** 1933.740*** 1792.910*** 
Pseudo R2 0.183 0.164 0.157 0.145 
Level of significance: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1 
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Panel B. The Effects of Professionalization on the Use of Debt (The Second Stage): Probit Models 
 Third Follow-up (Full sample) Pooled Sample Using All Four Surveys (Full sample) 
Dep. Var. Business Bank Loan Business Loan Business Bank Loan Business Loan 
Invmills 0.539 
(0.590) 
0.773 
(0.770) 
0.070 
(0.080) 
0.306 
(0.330) 
0.767** 
(2.160) 
0.672* 
(1.810) 
0.677** 
(2.020) 
0.632* 
(1.810) 
Personnel   -0.203** 
(-2.000) 
 -0.133 
(-1.430) 
 -0.147*** 
(-3.580) 
 -0.150*** 
(-3.870) 
HR  0.516 
(0.900) 
 0.275 
(0.510) 
 0.374** 
(2.110) 
 0.420** 
(2.510) 
 
Sales -0.065 
(-0.230) 
 -0.086 
(-0.320) 
 -0.044 
(-0.400) 
 -0.085 
(-0.810) 
 
R&D -0.160 
(-0.510) 
 -0.090 
(-0.310) 
 -0.354*** 
(-3.110) 
 -0.309*** 
(-2.850) 
 
Finance  -0.904 
(-1.230) 
 -0.512 
(-0.750) 
 -0.528** 
(-2.200) 
 -0.573** 
(-2.520) 
 
Total Assets  0.207 
(1.610) 
0.244* 
(1.680) 
0.149 
(1.240) 
0.184 
(1.360) 
0.265*** 
(6.220) 
0.257*** 
(5.700) 
0.249*** 
(6.240) 
0.247*** 
(5.870) 
Sole Owner -0.464*** 
(-2.660) 
-0.462*** 
(-2.740) 
-0.352** 
(-2.180) 
-0.368** 
(-2.370) 
-0.494*** 
(-4.520) 
-0.463*** 
(-4.200) 
-0.442*** 
(-4.300) 
-0.424*** 
(-4.110) 
Corporation  0.101 
(0.390) 
0.178 
(0.610) 
0.002 
(0.010) 
0.064 
(0.230) 
0.233** 
(2.360) 
0.215** 
(2.040) 
0.216** 
(2.300) 
0.210** 
(2.120) 
Partnership -0.106 
(-0.380) 
-0.187 
(-0.640) 
0.049 
(0.190) 
-0.034 
(-0.120) 
-0.187* 
(-1.730) 
-0.188* 
(-1.690) 
-0.133 
(-1.310) 
-0.145 
(-1.400) 
Work Exp 0.003 
(0.310) 
0.007 
(0.600) 
-0.001 
(-0.100) 
0.002 
(0.160) 
0.006 
(1.330) 
0.006 
(1.160) 
0.007* 
(1.660) 
0.007 
(1.580) 
High School -0.188 
(-0.510) 
-0.139 
(-0.380) 
-0.590* 
(-1.860) 
-0.557* 
(-1.750) 
-0.145 
(-0.920) 
-0.142 
(-0.900) 
-0.222 
(-1.480) 
-0.212 
(-1.410) 
Post Secondary -0.237 
(-0.700) 
-0.181 
(-0.530) 
-0.664** 
(-2.320) 
-0.619** 
(-2.140) 
-0.351** 
(-2.400) 
-0.350** 
(-2.390) 
-0.401*** 
(-2.900) 
-0.390*** 
(-2.800) 
Post Graduate -0.431 
(-1.190) 
-0.344 
(-0.910) 
-0.717** 
(-2.320) 
-0.656** 
(-2.010) 
-0.390** 
(-2.490) 
-0.398** 
(-2.520) 
-0.379** 
(-2.560) 
-0.375** 
(-2.510) 
Minority -0.160 
(-0.980) 
-0.155 
(-0.960) 
-0.196 
(-1.260) 
-0.154 
(-1.010) 
-0.172** 
(-2.430) 
-0.171** 
(-2.400) 
-0.208*** 
(-3.080) 
-0.193*** 
(-2.880) 
Male --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Age Owner  -0.078 
(-0.930) 
-0.113 
(-1.170) 
-0.044 
(-0.550) 
-0.066 
(-0.730) 
-0.100*** 
(-2.890) 
-0.100*** 
(-2.650) 
-0.093*** 
(-2.830) 
-0.097*** 
(-2.710) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  --- --- --- --- Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  -2.709* 
(-1.670) 
-3.204* 
(-1.720) 
-1.505 
(-1.000) 
-1.993 
(-1.150) 
-3.266*** 
(-5.700) 
-3.147*** 
(-5.170) 
-2.958*** 
(-5.490) 
-2.935*** 
(-5.150) 
N 1713 1726 1717 1730 9007 9053 9034 9080 
LR value 78.980*** 77.460*** 83.350*** 79.830*** 448.750*** 443.970 *** 497.330*** 489.740*** 
Pseudo R2 0.083 0.081 0.076 0.072 0.093 0.092 0.091 0.089 
Level of significance: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1 
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Panel C. The Effects of Professionalization on the Amount of Debt (The Second Stage): OLS 
 Third Follow-up (Full Sample) Pooled Sample Using All Four Surveys (Full Sample) 
Dep. Var. Total Debt Total Business Debt Total Debt Total Business Debt 
Invmills 1.168 
(0.940) 
1.480 
(1.050) 
2.815** 
(2.510) 
3.438*** 
(2.730) 
1.397*** 
(2.890) 
1.413*** 
(2.800) 
2.305*** 
(5.360) 
2.289*** 
(5.100) 
Personnel  -0.267* 
(-1.840) 
 -0.583*** 
(-4.490) 
 -0.261*** 
(-4.470) 
 -0.441*** 
(-8.490) 
HR  0.929 
(1.130) 
 1.557** 
(2.120) 
 0.818*** 
(3.270) 
 1.006*** 
(4.510) 
 
Sales 0.386 
(0.960) 
 0.893** 
(2.470) 
 0.302* 
(1.910) 
 0.206 
(1.470) 
 
R&D 0.118 
(0.270) 
 -0.924** 
(-2.330) 
 -0.450*** 
(-2.720) 
 -0.750*** 
(-5.100) 
 
Finance  -2.263** 
(-2.170) 
 -3.408*** 
(-3.640) 
 -1.578*** 
(-4.610) 
 -2.074*** 
(-6.800) 
 
Total Assets  0.558*** 
(3.070) 
0.607*** 
(2.940) 
0.678*** 
(4.150) 
0.775*** 
(4.170) 
0.560*** 
(9.680) 
0.570*** 
(9.270) 
0.538*** 
(10.440) 
0.545*** 
(9.960) 
Sole Owner -0.139 
(-0.570) 
-0.143 
(-0.600) 
-0.639*** 
(-2.920) 
-0.637*** 
(-3.000) 
-0.711*** 
(-4.690) 
-0.696*** 
(-4.570) 
-0.977*** 
(-7.240) 
-0.956*** 
(-7.050) 
Corporation  0.677* 
(1.780) 
0.768* 
(1.770) 
1.090*** 
(3.180) 
1.287*** 
(3.300) 
0.636*** 
(4.390) 
0.650*** 
(4.250) 
0.891*** 
(6.900) 
0.904*** 
(6.640) 
Partnership -0.526 
(-1.260) 
-0.679 
(-1.550) 
-0.511 
(-1.360) 
-0.734* 
(-1.870) 
-0.593*** 
(-3.720) 
-0.638*** 
(-3.930) 
-0.581*** 
(-4.090) 
-0.622*** 
(-4.310) 
Work Exp 0.001 
(0.040) 
0.006 
(0.320) 
0.037** 
(2.550) 
0.046*** 
(2.760) 
0.001 
(0.090) 
0.002 
(0.290) 
0.027*** 
(4.620) 
0.029*** 
(4.570) 
High School -0.864 
(-1.330) 
-0.747 
(-1.150) 
-1.430** 
(-2.450) 
-1.236** 
(-2.110) 
-0.169 
(-0.590) 
-0.139 
(-0.480) 
-0.656** 
(-2.550) 
-0.629** 
(-2.450) 
Post Secondary -0.789 
(-1.310) 
-0.648 
(-1.060) 
-0.906* 
(-1.670) 
-0.659 
(-1.200) 
-0.129 
(-0.480) 
-0.081 
(-0.300) 
-0.497** 
(-2.080) 
-0.448* 
(-1.870) 
Post Graduate -0.755 
(-1.190) 
-0.526 
(-0.800) 
-0.901 
(-1.590) 
-0.515 
(-0.870) 
-0.189 
(-0.680) 
-0.142 
(-0.500) 
-0.402 
(-1.610) 
-0.362 
(-1.440) 
Minority -0.363 
(-1.530) 
-0.349 
(-1.480) 
-0.287 
(-1.340) 
-0.291 
(-1.370) 
-0.004 
(-0.040) 
0.010 
(0.110) 
-0.110 
(-1.300) 
-0.092 
(-1.090) 
Male --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Age Owner  -0.149 
(-1.210) 
-0.195 
(-1.370) 
-0.327*** 
(-2.950) 
-0.403*** 
(-3.160) 
-0.180*** 
(-3.590) 
-0.198*** 
(-3.650) 
-0.269*** 
(-6.020) 
-0.288*** 
(-5.960) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  --- --- --- --- Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  -0.269 
(-0.120) 
-1.064 
(-0.400) 
-3.428* 
(-1.650) 
-4.884** 
(-2.040) 
-0.888 
(-1.110) 
-1.014 
(-1.190) 
-2.544*** 
(-3.560) 
-2.644*** 
(-3.500) 
N 1724 1737 1721 1734 9057 9103 9049 9095 
F-value 11.350*** 12.630*** 8.740*** 9.690*** 54.850*** 61.460*** 39.180*** 43.640*** 
Adj R-squared 0.120 0.113 0.090 0.090 0.129 0.128 0.095 0.094 
Level of significance: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1 
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Table 5. Effects of Change in Professionalization on Change in New Venture Debt Financing (Model 3) 
 
Results presented in this table are based on Model 3. The dependent variables in Model 3 are Change 
Business Bank Loan, Change Business Loan, Change Total Debt, and Change Total Business Debt. 
Each of the dependent variables is a dummy variable, whose value is one if the change is positive, and 
zero if the change is negative. Therefore, Model 3 is repetitively estimated using the logit models.  
 
Panel A and Panel B of this table present the results based on the former two dependent variables 
Change Business Bank Loan and Change Business Loan and the later two dependent variables Change 
Total Debt and Change Total Business Debt, respectively. Model 3 is first estimated using full sample 
variable differences between the Third Follow-up and the Second Follow-up. Control variables 
measuring firm characteristics as well as owner characteristics in the Second Follow-up are used for this 
analysis. Model 3 is then estimated based on the change in the pooled full sample. The dependent 
variables are constructed based on the sum of changes between the adjacent time intervals. The control 
variables measuring firm and owner characteristics in the pooled sample using the Baseline, the First 
and the Second Follow-up are used for this model.  
 
Follow the same procedure as Panel A and Panel B, Panel C and Panel D report the results based the 
sub-samples by excluding all the sole proprietorship cases.  
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Panel A. The Effects of Change in Professionalization on the Change in the Use of Debt (Full Sample) 
 Third Follow-up minus Second Follow-up  Change in Pooled Sample  
Dep. Var. Change Business Bank Loan Change Business Loan Change Business Bank Loan Change Business Loan 
Change Incentive Plan  2.268*** 
(3.220) 
2.255*** 
(3.260) 
1.376*** 
(2.800) 
1.322*** 
(2.750) 
0.485** 
(2.100) 
0.529** 
(2.320) 
0.502** 
(2.520) 
0.551*** 
(2.790) 
Change Total Assets -0.062 
(-0.450) 
-0.098 
(-0.740) 
-0.023 
(-0.210) 
-0.016 
(-0.150) 
0.154*** 
(2.940) 
0.150*** 
(2.900) 
0.151*** 
(3.180) 
0.149*** 
(3.160) 
Personnel   -0.737** 
(-2.490) 
 -0.284 
(-1.320) 
 -0.108 
(-1.050) 
 -0.071 
(-0.790) 
HR  0.752 
(0.530) 
 0.213 
(0.190) 
 -0.220 
(-0.440) 
 -0.281 
(-0.620) 
 
Sales -0.422 
(-0.380) 
 0.330 
(0.340) 
 0.219 
(0.410) 
 0.311 
(0.650) 
 
R&D -1.822 
(-1.520) 
 -1.509 
(-1.560) 
 0.073 
(0.160) 
 0.049 
(0.110) 
 
Finance  -1.145 
(-0.890) 
 -0.485 
(-0.450) 
 -0.575 
(-1.040) 
 -0.507 
(-0.990) 
 
Sole Owner -2.285** 
(-2.410) 
-2.210** 
(-2.330) 
-1.244* 
(-1.830) 
-1.128* 
(-1.700) 
0.394 
(1.200) 
0.375 
(1.150) 
0.327 
(1.130) 
0.312 
(1.090) 
Corporation  -0.251 
(-0.520) 
-0.262 
(-0.550) 
-0.025 
(-0.060) 
0.095 
(0.250) 
-0.083 
(-0.400) 
-0.081 
(-0.390) 
-0.083 
(-0.450) 
-0.064 
(-0.350) 
Partnership 1.006 
(0.780) 
0.957 
(0.750) 
0.888 
(0.950) 
0.890 
(0.960) 
-0.855* 
(-1.660) 
-0.852* 
(-1.660) 
-0.511 
(-1.260) 
-0.517 
(-1.280) 
Work Exp 0.014 
(0.630) 
0.014 
(0.610) 
-0.008 
(-0.400) 
-0.008 
(-0.470) 
0.003 
(0.270) 
0.002 
(0.220) 
0.000 
(-0.050) 
0.000 
(-0.050) 
High School -1.059 
(-0.700) 
-1.198 
(-0.790) 
-0.659 
(-0.530) 
-0.665 
(-0.540) 
0.380 
(0.510) 
0.367 
(0.490) 
0.129 
(0.200) 
0.092 
(0.140) 
Post Secondary 0.694 
(0.490) 
0.451 
(0.330) 
0.177 
(0.160) 
0.180 
(0.160) 
0.560 
(0.800) 
0.586 
(0.830) 
0.291 
(0.480) 
0.303 
(0.500) 
Post Graduate -0.642 
(-0.440) 
-0.876 
(-0.610) 
-0.352 
(-0.300) 
-0.367 
(-0.310) 
0.660 
(0.910) 
0.673 
(0.930) 
0.294 
(0.470) 
0.287 
(0.460) 
Minority 0.598 
(0.740) 
0.528 
(0.670) 
0.388 
(0.640) 
0.375 
(0.630) 
0.037 
(0.120) 
0.038 
(0.120) 
0.214 
(0.770) 
0.208 
(0.750) 
Male 0.863 
(1.030) 
0.739 
(0.910) 
0.821 
(1.320) 
0.607 
(1.010) 
0.017 
(0.060) 
0.033 
(0.110) 
0.109 
(0.410) 
0.096 
(0.370) 
Age Owner  0.198 
(0.870) 
0.222 
(1.030) 
0.012 
(0.060) 
0.061 
(0.330) 
-0.081 
(-0.820) 
-0.076 
(-0.780) 
-0.047 
(-0.520) 
-0.036 
(-0.410) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  --- --- --- --- Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  -1.241 
(-0.620) 
-0.840 
(-0.440) 
-0.322 
(-0.210) 
-0.278 
(-0.180) 
0.008 
(0.010) 
-0.055 
(-0.060) 
0.128 
(0.170) 
0.089 
(0.120) 
N 137 137 171 172 514 516 627 631 
LR Value  36.620** 34.740** 23.870 20.170 31.510 31.540* 35.290* 35.190** 
Pseudo R2   0.195 0.185 0.102 0.086 0.044 0.044 0.041 0.040 
Level of significance: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1 
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Panel B. The Effects of Change in Professionalization on the Change in the Amount of Debt (Full Sample) 
 Third Follow-up minus Second Follow-up  Change in Pooled Sample  
Dep. Var. Change Total Debt Change Total Business Debt Change Total Debt Change Total Business Debt 
Change Incentive Plan  0.270 
(1.530) 
0.267 
(1.520) 
0.311 
(1.420) 
0.317 
(1.460) 
0.066 
(0.780) 
0.058 
(0.690) 
0.114 
(1.110) 
0.109 
(1.070) 
Change Total Assets 0.142*** 
(3.470) 
0.143*** 
(3.520) 
0.148*** 
(2.960) 
0.145*** 
(2.920) 
0.139*** 
(7.390) 
0.139*** 
(7.410) 
0.103*** 
(4.370) 
0.102*** 
(4.320) 
Personnel   -0.025 
(-0.290) 
 0.117 
(1.140) 
 0.051 
(1.290) 
 0.080 
(1.640) 
HR  -0.358 
(-0.940) 
 0.115 
(0.230) 
 -0.010 
(-0.060) 
 0.146 
(0.640) 
 
Sales -0.227 
(-0.530) 
 0.810 
(1.600) 
 0.197 
(1.030) 
 0.317 
(1.320) 
 
R&D 0.259 
(0.650) 
 0.275 
(0.580) 
 0.201 
(1.110) 
 0.268 
(1.190) 
 
Finance  0.097 
(0.210) 
 -0.831 
(-1.560) 
 -0.222 
(-1.100) 
 -0.422 
(-1.630) 
 
Sole Owner -0.069 
(-0.310) 
-0.069 
(-0.310) 
-0.045 
(-0.170) 
-0.092 
(-0.350) 
-0.019 
(-0.160) 
-0.028 
(-0.250) 
0.222 
(1.580) 
0.200 
(1.440) 
Corporation  -0.248 
(-1.440) 
-0.235 
(-1.370) 
-0.100 
(-0.520) 
-0.100 
(-0.530) 
-0.017 
(-0.190) 
-0.013 
(-0.150) 
0.090 
(0.890) 
0.083 
(0.830) 
Partnership -0.349 
(-0.960) 
-0.323 
(-0.900) 
0.612 
(1.350) 
0.579 
(1.290) 
-0.058 
(-0.350) 
-0.061 
(-0.380) 
-0.107 
(-0.520) 
-0.126 
(-0.620) 
Work Exp 0.000 
(-0.030) 
0.000 
(-0.020) 
-0.003 
(-0.320) 
-0.003 
(-0.310) 
0.005 
(1.130) 
0.005 
(1.290) 
0.000 
(0.040) 
0.001 
(0.180) 
High School -1.647* 
(-1.900) 
-1.652* 
(-1.910) 
-1.581* 
(-1.710) 
-1.548* 
(-1.690) 
-0.114 
(-0.320) 
-0.115 
(-0.320) 
-0.307 
(-0.780) 
-0.333 
(-0.850) 
Post Secondary -1.404* 
(-1.710) 
-1.409* 
(-1.710) 
-0.885 
(-1.020) 
-0.840 
(-0.980) 
-0.113 
(-0.340) 
-0.101 
(-0.300) 
0.005 
(0.010) 
0.007 
(0.020) 
Post Graduate -1.275 
(-1.540) 
-1.273 
(-1.530) 
-1.067 
(-1.220) 
-1.032 
(-1.180) 
-0.116 
(-0.340) 
-0.109 
(-0.320) 
0.024 
(0.060) 
0.021 
(0.060) 
Minority -0.302 
(-1.330) 
-0.310 
(-1.360) 
0.025 
(0.100) 
-0.007 
(-0.030) 
0.126 
(1.080) 
0.122 
(1.040) 
0.051 
(0.360) 
0.042 
(0.300) 
Male -0.059 
(-0.260) 
-0.085 
(-0.390) 
0.542** 
(2.070) 
0.521** 
(2.010) 
-0.036 
(-0.330) 
-0.047 
(-0.430) 
0.281** 
(2.150) 
0.265** 
(2.030) 
Age Owner  -0.180** 
(-2.350) 
-0.177** 
(-2.330) 
-0.086 
(-0.980) 
-0.080 
(-0.920) 
-0.005 
(-0.120) 
-0.003 
(-0.070) 
-0.057 
(-1.250) 
-0.056 
(-1.240) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  --- --- --- --- Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  2.152** 
(2.390) 
2.140** 
(2.370) 
0.796 
(0.820) 
0.748 
(0.770) 
0.025 
(0.070) 
0.005 
(0.010) 
-0.056 
(-0.130) 
-0.060 
(-0.140) 
N 779 780 605 606 2956 2974 2144 2155 
LR Value  35.260** 33.670** 32.630* 28.760* 85.130*** 83.890*** 61.810*** 56.790*** 
Pseudo R2 0.033 0.031 0.039 0.034 0.021 0.020 0.021 0.019 
Level of significance: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1 
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Panel C. The Effects of Change in Professionalization on the Change in the Use of Debt (Sub-Samples) 
 
 Third Follow-up minus Second Follow-up  Change in Pooled Sample  
Dep. Var. Change Business Bank Loan Change Business Loan Change Business Bank Loan Change Business Loan 
Change Incentive Plan  2.562*** 
(2.970) 
2.532*** 
(3.030) 
1.298** 
(2.420) 
1.254** 
(2.390) 
0.586** 
(2.330) 
0.635** 
(2.550) 
0.520** 
(2.410) 
0.576*** 
(2.710) 
Change  
Total Assets 
-0.145 
(-0.920) 
-0.172 
(-1.140) 
-0.072 
(-0.570) 
-0.063 
(-0.510) 
0.133** 
(2.400) 
0.129** 
(2.370) 
0.130** 
(2.580) 
0.127** 
(2.550) 
Personnel   -0.792** 
(-2.500) 
 -0.343 
(-1.510) 
 -0.135 
(-1.250) 
 -0.092 
(-0.970) 
HR  -0.094 
(-0.060) 
 0.049 
(0.040) 
 -0.319 
(-0.600) 
 -0.350 
(-0.740) 
 
Sales 0.067 
(0.060) 
 0.665 
(0.650) 
 0.101 
(0.180) 
 0.198 
(0.390) 
 
R&D -1.815 
(-1.500) 
 -1.591 
(-1.580) 
 0.177 
(0.360) 
 0.191 
(0.420) 
 
Finance  -1.200 
(-0.930) 
 -0.836 
(-0.770) 
 -0.580 
(-0.990) 
 -0.566 
(-1.050) 
 
Sole Owner Dropped 
Corporation  -0.180 
(-0.370) 
-0.200 
(-0.410) 
-0.005 
(-0.010) 
0.106 
(0.270) 
-0.101 
(-0.480) 
-0.105 
(-0.510) 
-0.088 
(-0.470) 
-0.073 
(-0.390) 
Partnership 1.213 
(0.930) 
1.166 
(0.900) 
0.906 
(0.970) 
0.909 
(0.980) 
-0.924* 
(-1.780) 
-0.916* 
(-1.770) 
-0.546 
(-1.340) 
-0.549 
(-1.360) 
Work Exp 0.029 
(1.220) 
0.026 
(1.110) 
-0.003 
(-0.150) 
-0.005 
(-0.270) 
0.001 
(0.110) 
0.001 
(0.060) 
-0.001 
(-0.080) 
0.000 
(-0.050) 
High School -1.368 
(-0.830) 
-1.485 
(-0.920) 
-0.791 
(-0.500) 
-0.814 
(-0.520) 
-0.007 
(-0.010) 
-0.049 
(-0.060) 
-0.080 
(-0.100) 
-0.134 
(-0.180) 
Post Secondary 0.235 
(0.150) 
0.058 
(0.040) 
0.133 
(0.090) 
0.123 
(0.080) 
0.063 
(0.080) 
0.061 
(0.070) 
0.023 
(0.030) 
0.018 
(0.030) 
Post Graduate -1.069 
(-0.670) 
-1.249 
(-0.790) 
-0.414 
(-0.270) 
-0.432 
(-0.280) 
0.134 
(0.160) 
0.133 
(0.160) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.014 
(-0.020) 
Minority 0.371 
(0.420) 
0.332 
(0.390) 
0.568 
(0.840) 
0.558 
(0.840) 
0.034 
(0.090) 
0.032 
(0.090) 
0.334 
(1.050) 
0.325 
(1.020) 
Male 0.739 
(0.790) 
0.635 
(0.690) 
0.393 
(0.550) 
0.136 
(0.200) 
0.111 
(0.320) 
0.118 
(0.340) 
0.184 
(0.610) 
0.159 
(0.530) 
Age Owner  0.081 
(0.330) 
0.138 
(0.590) 
-0.014 
(-0.070) 
0.056 
(0.280) 
-0.049 
(-0.470) 
-0.047 
(-0.460) 
-0.012 
(-0.120) 
-0.004 
(-0.050) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  --- --- --- --- Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  -0.303 
(-0.140) 
-0.035 
(-0.020) 
0.364 
(0.190) 
0.424 
(0.230) 
0.451 
(0.450) 
0.418 
(0.420) 
0.328 
(0.370) 
0.304 
(0.350) 
N 125 125 153 154 455 457 551 555 
LR Value  31.430* 30.070** 19.150 15.220 30.400 30.590* 32.030 31.790* 
Pseudo R2   0.185 0.177 0.092 0.073 0.048 0.048 0.042 0.041 
Level of significance: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1 
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Panel D. The Effects of Change in Professionalization on the Change in the Amount of Debt (Sub-Samples) 
 
 Third Follow-up minus Second Follow-up  Change in Pooled Sample 
Dep. Var. Change Total Debt Change Total Business Debt Change Total Debt Change Total Business Debt 
Change Incentive Plan  0.636*** 
(3.000) 
0.627*** 
(2.970) 
0.379 
(1.500) 
0.395 
(1.580) 
0.093 
(0.980) 
0.089 
(0.950) 
0.137 
(1.220) 
0.143 
(1.280) 
Change  
Total Assets 
0.113** 
(2.480) 
0.114** 
(2.510) 
0.102* 
(1.830) 
0.100* 
(1.830) 
0.129*** 
(6.180) 
0.129*** 
(6.200) 
0.081*** 
(3.110) 
0.079*** 
(3.040) 
Personnel   -0.055 
(-0.580) 
 0.150 
(1.330) 
 0.047 
(1.120) 
 0.085 
(1.640) 
HR  -0.258 
(-0.600) 
 0.137 
(0.240) 
 -0.014 
(-0.080) 
 0.105 
(0.430) 
 
Sales 0.102 
(0.210) 
 1.228** 
(2.160) 
 0.323 
(1.540) 
 0.386 
(1.470) 
 
R&D 0.348 
(0.790) 
 0.594 
(1.150) 
 0.262 
(1.350) 
 0.454* 
(1.900) 
 
Finance  -0.562 
(-1.050) 
 -1.489** 
(-2.390) 
 -0.435** 
(-1.980) 
 -0.641** 
(-2.270) 
 
Sole Owner Dropped 
Corporation  -0.261 
(-1.500) 
-0.262 
(-1.510) 
-0.089 
(-0.460) 
-0.100 
(-0.530) 
-0.022 
(-0.250) 
-0.021 
(-0.240) 
0.088 
(0.860) 
0.076 
(0.750) 
Partnership -0.323 
(-0.880) 
-0.314 
(-0.870) 
0.592 
(1.300) 
0.545 
(1.220) 
-0.031 
(-0.190) 
-0.047 
(-0.290) 
-0.100 
(-0.480) 
-0.127 
(-0.620) 
Work Exp -0.006 
(-0.610) 
-0.005 
(-0.510) 
-0.006 
(-0.610) 
-0.006 
(-0.600) 
0.003 
(0.750) 
0.004 
(0.960) 
-0.001 
(-0.240) 
0.000 
(-0.020) 
High School -0.952 
(-0.970) 
-0.934 
(-0.960) 
-1.814 
(-1.430) 
-1.701 
(-1.370) 
-0.087 
(-0.200) 
-0.079 
(-0.180) 
-0.375 
(-0.780) 
-0.382 
(-0.800) 
Post Secondary -0.541 
(-0.600) 
-0.524 
(-0.580) 
-1.050 
(-0.880) 
-0.964 
(-0.820) 
0.013 
(0.030) 
0.011 
(0.030) 
-0.059 
(-0.140) 
-0.055 
(-0.130) 
Post Graduate -0.539 
(-0.590) 
-0.516 
(-0.570) 
-1.276 
(-1.060) 
-1.195 
(-1.010) 
-0.033 
(-0.080) 
-0.037 
(-0.090) 
-0.055 
(-0.120) 
-0.047 
(-0.110) 
Minority -0.534** 
(-1.990) 
-0.538** 
(-2.000) 
-0.112 
(-0.380) 
-0.136 
(-0.470) 
0.080 
(0.600) 
0.079 
(0.590) 
0.068 
(0.420) 
0.054 
(0.340) 
Male -0.047 
(-0.170) 
-0.079 
(-0.290) 
0.438 
(1.400) 
0.375 
(1.220) 
0.112 
(0.860) 
0.101 
(0.780) 
0.308** 
(2.020) 
0.282* 
(1.860) 
Age Owner  -0.188** 
(-2.160) 
-0.193** 
(-2.250) 
-0.095 
(-0.960) 
-0.089 
(-0.920) 
-0.002 
(-0.040) 
-0.001 
(-0.010) 
-0.048 
(-0.940) 
-0.051 
(-1.010) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  --- --- --- --- Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  1.539 
(1.540) 
1.515 
(1.530) 
1.191 
(0.920) 
1.131 
(0.890) 
-0.240 
(-0.540) 
-0.252 
(-0.570) 
0.016 
(0.030) 
0.017 
(0.040) 
N 631 632 503 504 2457 2473 1805 1815 
LR Value  36.300** 34.520** 27.570 19.740 71.270*** 66.590*** 50.190*** 42.250*** 
Pseudo R2 0.042 0.040 0.040 0.028 0.021 0.019 0.020 0.017 
Level of significance: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1 
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Table 6. Effects of Change in Professionalization on Change in New Venture Debt Financing (Model 4)  
 
The results of Panel A to D presented in this table are based on Model 4. As Model 3, the dependent 
variables are Change Business Bank Loan, Change Business Loan, Change Total Debt, and Change 
Total Business Debt. Each of the dependent variable is a dummy, whose value is one if the change is 
positive, and zero if the change is negative or zero. Model 4 is estimated using the logit models 
repetitively.   
 
Panel A and Panel B of this table present the results based on the former two dependent variables 
Change Business Bank Loan and Change Business Loan and the later two dependent variables Change 
Total Debt and Change Total Business Debt, respectively. Model 4 is first estimated using full sample 
variable differences between the Third Follow-Up and the Second Follow-Up. Control variables 
measuring firm characteristics as well as owner characteristics in the Second Follow-up are used for this 
model. Model 4 is then estimated based on the change in the pooled full sample. The dependent 
variables are constructed based on the sum of change between the adjacent time intervals. The control 
variables measuring firm and owner characteristics in the pooled sample using the Baseline, the First 
and the Second Follow-Up are used for this model.  
 
Follow the same procedure as Panel A and Panel B, Panel C and Panel D report the results based the 
sub-samples by excluding all the sole proprietorship cases.  
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Panel A. The Effects of Change in Professionalization on the Increasing in the Use of Debt (Full Sample) 
 Third Follow-up minus Second Follow-up  Change in Pooled Sample  
Dep. Var. Change Business Bank Loan Change Business Loan Change Business Bank Loan Change Business Loan 
Change  
Incentive Plan  
1.086*** 
(3.740) 
1.104*** 
(3.840) 
1.003*** 
(3.900) 
1.001*** 
(3.950) 
0.455*** 
(3.140) 
0.482*** 
(3.340) 
0.483*** 
(3.650) 
0.519*** 
(3.950) 
Change  
Total Assets 
-0.004 
(-0.060) 
-0.009 
(-0.130) 
0.009 
(0.160) 
0.007 
(0.120) 
0.062** 
(2.040) 
0.061** 
(2.010) 
0.057** 
(2.040) 
0.054** 
(1.960) 
Personnel   -0.330** 
(-2.100) 
 -0.131 
(-1.030) 
 -0.169** 
(-2.330) 
 -0.140** 
(-2.150) 
HR  0.977 
(1.360) 
 0.904 
(1.510) 
 0.380 
(1.150) 
 0.474 
(1.590) 
 
Sales 0.698 
(1.130) 
 0.840 
(1.550) 
 0.116 
(0.350) 
 0.139 
(0.460) 
 
R&D -1.928** 
(-2.570) 
 -1.741*** 
(-2.800) 
 -0.459 
(-1.390) 
 -0.491 
(-1.650) 
 
Finance  -1.055 
(-1.380) 
 -0.689 
(-1.080) 
 -0.694* 
(-1.880) 
 -0.719** 
(-2.140) 
 
Sole Owner -1.711*** 
(-3.110) 
-1.732*** 
(-3.150) 
-1.182*** 
(-2.870) 
-1.194*** 
(-2.910) 
-0.534** 
(-2.500) 
-0.530** 
(-2.480) 
-0.473** 
(-2.470) 
-0.467** 
(-2.440) 
Corporation  0.100 
(0.390) 
0.084 
(0.330) 
0.059 
(0.250) 
0.075 
(0.320) 
-0.053 
(-0.370) 
-0.036 
(-0.250) 
-0.099 
(-0.750) 
-0.063 
(-0.480) 
Partnership -0.258 
(-0.450) 
-0.297 
(-0.530) 
-0.043 
(-0.090) 
-0.119 
(-0.250) 
-1.124*** 
(-2.810) 
-1.139*** 
(-2.850) 
-0.769** 
(-2.460) 
-0.787** 
(-2.530) 
Work Exp -0.018 
(-1.340) 
-0.018 
(-1.340) 
-0.011 
(-0.910) 
-0.009 
(-0.740) 
-0.006 
(-0.820) 
-0.005 
(-0.770) 
-0.002 
(-0.390) 
-0.001 
(-0.170) 
High School 0.452 
(0.390) 
0.430 
(0.380) 
-0.075 
(-0.090) 
-0.043 
(-0.050) 
0.480 
(0.850) 
0.496 
(0.880) 
0.093 
(0.190) 
0.114 
(0.240) 
Post Secondary 0.264 
(0.250) 
0.216 
(0.200) 
-0.372 
(-0.470) 
-0.356 
(-0.450) 
-0.054 
(-0.100) 
-0.032 
(-0.060) 
-0.347 
(-0.780) 
-0.315 
(-0.710) 
Post Graduate -0.569 
(-0.510) 
-0.696 
(-0.630) 
-0.739 
(-0.900) 
-0.811 
(-1.000) 
-0.295 
(-0.540) 
-0.293 
(-0.540) 
-0.492 
(-1.080) 
-0.494 
(-1.090) 
Minority -0.125 
(-0.310) 
-0.130 
(-0.330) 
-0.181 
(-0.510) 
-0.188 
(-0.530) 
-0.083 
(-0.400) 
-0.090 
(-0.430) 
0.050 
(0.270) 
0.040 
(0.220) 
Male 1.155** 
(2.130) 
1.151** 
(2.130) 
0.790* 
(1.900) 
0.638 
(1.620) 
0.340 
(1.580) 
0.344 
(1.600) 
0.266 
(1.390) 
0.243 
(1.290) 
Age Owner  0.032 
(0.260) 
0.052 
(0.420) 
0.010 
(0.090) 
0.031 
(0.280) 
-0.009 
(-0.140) 
-0.013 
(-0.190) 
0.006 
(0.100) 
0.006 
(0.090) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  --- --- --- --- Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  -3.773*** 
(-2.990) 
-3.716*** 
(-2.960) 
-2.814*** 
(-2.910) 
-2.750*** 
(-2.880) 
-3.012*** 
(-4.760) 
-3.060*** 
(-4.840) 
-2.516*** 
(-4.650) 
-2.576*** 
(-4.780) 
N 1465 1469 1474 1478 5186 5211 5221 5246 
LR Value  72.150*** 63.230*** 56.630*** 44.480*** 84.930*** 81.280*** 80.250*** 73.290*** 
Pseudo R2   0.118 0.104 0.079 0.061 0.042 0.040 0.034 0.031 
Level of significance: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1 
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Panel B. The Effects of Change in Professionalization on the Increasing in the Amount of Debt (Full Sample) 
 Third Follow-up minus Second Follow-up Change in Pooled Sample  
Dep. Var. Change Total Debt Change Total Business Debt Change Total Debt Change Total Business Debt 
Change Incentive Plan  0.225 
(1.490) 
0.219 
(1.460) 
0.313* 
(1.930) 
0.316* 
(1.940) 
0.115 
(1.600) 
0.109 
(1.530) 
0.113 
(1.460) 
0.124 
(1.610) 
Change  
Total Assets 
0.136*** 
(4.200) 
0.137*** 
(4.240) 
0.092*** 
(2.680) 
0.090*** 
(2.650) 
0.119*** 
(7.960) 
0.120*** 
(8.000) 
0.052*** 
(3.210) 
0.050*** 
(3.140) 
Personnel  0.034 
(0.500) 
 -0.016 
(-0.210) 
 0.046 
(1.460) 
 -0.016 
(-0.450) 
HR  -0.151 
(-0.490) 
 0.216 
(0.630) 
 0.065 
(0.450) 
 0.139 
(0.860) 
 
Sales -0.234 
(-0.720) 
 0.289 
(0.820) 
 0.029 
(0.190) 
 0.224 
(1.320) 
 
R&D 0.231 
(0.730) 
 -0.044 
(-0.130) 
 0.174 
(1.190) 
 0.083 
(0.510) 
 
Finance  0.258 
(0.740) 
 -0.530 
(-1.360) 
 -0.106 
(-0.650) 
 -0.538*** 
(-2.920) 
 
Sole Owner -0.025 
(-0.140) 
-0.020 
(-0.110) 
-0.246 
(-1.220) 
-0.255 
(-1.260) 
-0.059 
(-0.620) 
-0.058 
(-0.620) 
-0.055 
(-0.530) 
-0.062 
(-0.600) 
Corporation  -0.019 
(-0.130) 
-0.005 
(-0.040) 
0.040 
(0.270) 
0.044 
(0.290) 
0.060 
(0.840) 
0.067 
(0.930) 
0.119 
(1.540) 
0.123 
(1.590) 
Partnership -0.356 
(-1.210) 
-0.359 
(-1.230) 
-0.161 
(-0.520) 
-0.180 
(-0.580) 
-0.159 
(-1.190) 
-0.152 
(-1.150) 
-0.395** 
(-2.470) 
-0.401** 
(-2.530) 
Work Exp -0.006 
(-0.930) 
-0.007 
(-0.960) 
-0.005 
(-0.710) 
-0.004 
(-0.600) 
-0.006 
(-1.640) 
-0.005 
(-1.480) 
-0.004 
(-1.070) 
-0.003 
(-0.910) 
High School -0.520 
(-0.950) 
-0.539 
(-0.990) 
-0.629 
(-1.030) 
-0.608 
(-1.000) 
0.080 
(0.270) 
0.089 
(0.300) 
-0.321 
(-1.040) 
-0.319 
(-1.040) 
Post Secondary -0.394 
(-0.800) 
-0.409 
(-0.830) 
-0.212 
(-0.390) 
-0.182 
(-0.340) 
0.020 
(0.070) 
0.033 
(0.120) 
-0.224 
(-0.800) 
-0.203 
(-0.730) 
Post Graduate -0.479 
(-0.950) 
-0.490 
(-0.970) 
-0.397 
(-0.710) 
-0.387 
(-0.700) 
-0.078 
(-0.280) 
-0.073 
(-0.260) 
-0.284 
(-1.000) 
-0.275 
(-0.970) 
Minority -0.174 
(-0.910) 
-0.177 
(-0.930) 
0.011 
(0.060) 
0.015 
(0.080) 
0.039 
(0.410) 
0.043 
(0.460) 
-0.038 
(-0.360) 
-0.041 
(-0.390) 
Male 0.151 
(0.830) 
0.123 
(0.680) 
0.417** 
(1.960) 
0.393* 
(1.870) 
0.055 
(0.600) 
0.044 
(0.480) 
0.228** 
(2.200) 
0.221** 
(2.150) 
Age Owner  -0.113* 
(-1.770) 
-0.109* 
(-1.720) 
-0.084 
(-1.220) 
-0.085 
(-1.240) 
-0.023 
(-0.720) 
-0.023 
(-0.720) 
-0.084** 
(-2.400) 
-0.085** 
(-2.460) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  --- --- --- --- Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  -0.447 
(-0.780) 
-0.433 
(-0.750) 
-1.108* 
(-1.750) 
-1.136* 
(-1.810) 
-1.069*** 
(-3.400) 
-1.094*** 
(-3.490) 
-1.003*** 
(-3.050) 
-1.039*** 
(-3.180) 
N 1483 1487 1478 1482 5248 5273 5235 5260 
LR Value  40.230** 39.100*** 31.960 29.420* 104.440*** 104.880*** 74.480*** 65.760*** 
Pseudo R2 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.020 0.017 0.017 0.014 0.012 
Level of significance: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1 
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Panel C. The Effects of Change in Professionalization on the Increasing in the Use of Debt (Sub-Samples) 
 
 Third Follow-up minus Second Follow-up  Change in Pooled Sample 
Dep. Var. Change Business Bank Loan Change Business Loan Change Business Bank Loan Change Business Loan 
Change Incentive Plan  1.018*** 
(3.350) 
1.036*** 
(3.450) 
0.963*** 
(3.470) 
0.963*** 
(3.530) 
0.444*** 
(2.820) 
0.478*** 
(3.040) 
0.459*** 
(3.170) 
0.504*** 
(3.510) 
Change  
Total Assets 
-0.001 
(-0.010) 
-0.005 
(-0.070) 
0.025 
(0.410) 
0.023 
(0.390) 
0.080** 
(2.430) 
0.078** 
(2.390) 
0.075** 
(2.500) 
0.071** 
(2.400) 
Personnel   -0.333** 
(-2.070) 
 -0.151 
(-1.140) 
 -0.217*** 
(-2.760) 
 -0.166** 
(-2.390) 
HR  0.742 
(1.000) 
 0.837 
(1.320) 
 0.182 
(0.510) 
 0.333 
(1.040) 
 
Sales 0.710 
(1.120) 
 0.908 
(1.620) 
 0.078 
(0.220) 
 0.117 
(0.360) 
 
R&D -1.787** 
(-2.360) 
 -1.762*** 
(-2.740) 
 -0.407 
(-1.160) 
 -0.423 
(-1.330) 
 
Finance  -1.002 
(-1.290) 
 -0.764 
(-1.140) 
 -0.727* 
(-1.840) 
 -0.754** 
(-2.100) 
 
Sole Owner Dropped 
Corporation  0.099 
(0.380) 
0.081 
(0.310) 
0.076 
(0.320) 
0.095 
(0.400) 
-0.048 
(-0.330) 
-0.034 
(-0.240) 
-0.090 
(-0.680) 
-0.056 
(-0.430) 
Partnership -0.271 
(-0.480) 
-0.319 
(-0.560) 
-0.033 
(-0.070) 
-0.115 
(-0.240) 
-1.157*** 
(-2.890) 
-1.171*** 
(-2.920) 
-0.795** 
(-2.540) 
-0.813*** 
(-2.600) 
Work Exp -0.014 
(-1.020) 
-0.014 
(-1.040) 
-0.010 
(-0.850) 
-0.009 
(-0.740) 
-0.009 
(-1.240) 
-0.009 
(-1.210) 
-0.007 
(-0.960) 
-0.005 
(-0.750) 
High School 0.453 
(0.390) 
0.387 
(0.330) 
0.714 
(0.620) 
0.706 
(0.620) 
0.603 
(0.930) 
0.612 
(0.940) 
0.261 
(0.450) 
0.273 
(0.470) 
Post Secondary 0.143 
(0.130) 
0.058 
(0.050) 
0.314 
(0.290) 
0.308 
(0.290) 
-0.034 
(-0.050) 
-0.015 
(-0.020) 
-0.203 
(-0.380) 
-0.177 
(-0.330) 
Post Graduate -0.724 
(-0.650) 
-0.880 
(-0.790) 
-0.083 
(-0.080) 
-0.180 
(-0.160) 
-0.338 
(-0.540) 
-0.337 
(-0.540) 
-0.436 
(-0.790) 
-0.442 
(-0.800) 
Minority -0.210 
(-0.500) 
-0.212 
(-0.500) 
-0.156 
(-0.420) 
-0.164 
(-0.440) 
-0.220 
(-0.900) 
-0.225 
(-0.920) 
-0.033 
(-0.160) 
-0.043 
(-0.210) 
Male 1.314** 
(2.140) 
1.313** 
(2.130) 
0.726 
(1.620) 
0.539 
(1.290) 
0.417* 
(1.650) 
0.422* 
(1.680) 
0.319 
(1.440) 
0.288 
(1.320) 
Age Owner  0.013 
(0.100) 
0.037 
(0.280) 
0.042 
(0.350) 
0.071 
(0.620) 
0.032 
(0.450) 
0.030 
(0.420) 
0.058 
(0.890) 
0.058 
(0.890) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  --- --- --- --- Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  -3.707*** 
(-2.840) 
-3.630*** 
(-2.810) 
-3.460*** 
(-2.830) 
-3.368*** 
(-2.780) 
-3.035*** 
(-4.230) 
-3.079*** 
(-4.290) 
-2.698*** 
(-4.250) 
-2.749*** 
(-4.350) 
N 1188 1192 1195 1199 4282 4305 4313 4336 
LR Value  52.590*** 45.530*** 41.900*** 30.270** 86.110*** 84.450*** 77.900*** 73.210*** 
Pseudo R2   0.095 0.082 0.066 0.047 0.049 0.048 0.039 0.036 
Level of significance: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1 
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Panel D. The Effects of Change in Professionalization on the Increasing in the Amount of Debt (Sub-sample) 
 
 Third Follow-up minus Second Follow-up  Change in Pooled Sample  
Dep. Var. Change Total Debt Change Total Business Debt Change Total Debt Change Total Business Debt 
Change Incentive Plan  0.519*** 
(2.970) 
0.514*** 
(2.930) 
0.434** 
(2.360) 
0.433** 
(2.360) 
0.145* 
(1.840) 
0.141* 
(1.790) 
0.130 
(1.530) 
0.145* 
(1.710) 
Change Total Assets 0.127*** 
(3.410) 
0.127** 
(3.410) 
0.071* 
(1.830) 
0.068* 
(1.770) 
0.112*** 
(6.760) 
0.112*** 
(6.790) 
0.042** 
(2.350) 
0.040** 
(2.250) 
Personnel   -0.009 
(-0.120) 
 -0.026 
(-0.330) 
 0.040 
(1.180) 
 -0.029 
(-0.750) 
HR  -0.100 
(-0.280) 
 0.278 
(0.730) 
 0.045 
(0.290) 
 0.072 
(0.410) 
 
Sales 0.024 
(0.070) 
 0.576 
(1.500) 
 0.095 
(0.570) 
 0.242 
(1.310) 
 
R&D 0.322 
(0.920) 
 0.081 
(0.210) 
 0.285* 
(1.820) 
 0.196 
(1.130) 
 
Finance  -0.348 
(-0.870) 
 -1.078** 
(-2.430) 
 -0.307* 
(-1.730) 
 -0.681*** 
(-3.400) 
 
Sole Owner Dropped 
Corporation  -0.021 
(-0.140) 
-0.020 
(-0.140) 
0.042 
(0.280) 
0.032 
(0.210) 
0.061 
(0.850) 
0.065 
(0.900) 
0.121 
(1.550) 
0.120 
(1.550) 
Partnership -0.317 
(-1.070) 
-0.325 
(-1.100) 
-0.139 
(-0.450) 
-0.164 
(-0.530) 
-0.138 
(-1.030) 
-0.136 
(-1.020) 
-0.373** 
(-2.330) 
-0.382** 
(-2.400) 
Work Exp -0.013 
(-1.650) 
-0.012 
(-1.590) 
-0.010 
(-1.210) 
-0.009 
(-1.060) 
-0.009** 
(-2.510) 
-0.009** 
(-2.310) 
-0.008* 
(-1.920) 
-0.007* 
(-1.750) 
High School -0.617 
(-0.850) 
-0.570 
(-0.790) 
-0.509 
(-0.640) 
-0.495 
(-0.640) 
-0.055 
(-0.150) 
-0.038 
(-0.110) 
-0.386 
(-1.020) 
-0.395 
(-1.050) 
Post Secondary -0.190 
(-0.290) 
-0.137 
(-0.210) 
-0.016 
(-0.020) 
-0.006 
(-0.010) 
-0.004 
(-0.010) 
0.011 
(0.030) 
-0.237 
(-0.690) 
-0.223 
(-0.660) 
Post Graduate -0.365 
(-0.550) 
-0.310 
(-0.470) 
-0.197 
(-0.270) 
-0.212 
(-0.300) 
-0.141 
(-0.420) 
-0.132 
(-0.390) 
-0.278 
(-0.800) 
-0.276 
(-0.800) 
Minority -0.396* 
(-1.710) 
-0.392* 
(-1.700) 
-0.102 
(-0.440) 
-0.094 
(-0.400) 
-0.018 
(-0.170) 
-0.008 
(-0.070) 
-0.100 
(-0.820) 
-0.100 
(-0.820) 
Male 0.196 
(0.880) 
0.167 
(0.760) 
0.399 
(1.590) 
0.355 
(1.440) 
0.194* 
(1.780) 
0.183* 
(1.690) 
0.267** 
(2.180) 
0.251** 
(2.070) 
Age Owner  -0.132* 
(-1.820) 
-0.135* 
(-1.870) 
-0.081 
(-1.050) 
-0.084 
(-1.100) 
-0.024 
(-0.690) 
-0.025 
(-0.710) 
-0.082** 
(-2.120) 
-0.085** 
(-2.210) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  --- --- --- --- Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  -0.366 
(-0.500) 
-0.421 
(-0.580) 
-1.170 
(-1.480) 
-1.169 
(-1.510) 
-1.094*** 
(-2.940) 
-1.131*** 
(-3.050) 
-0.929** 
(-2.390) 
-0.953** 
(-2.470) 
N 1202 1206 1198 1202 4334 4357 4323 4346 
LR Value  44.940*** 43.900*** 30.760 23.880 99.500*** 95.870*** 73.100*** 61.710*** 
Pseudo R2 0.033 0.032 0.025 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.016 0.014 
Level of significance: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1 
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Table 7. The Effects of Professionalization on New Ventures Debt Financing in the Panel Setting  
 
 Full Sample Sub-Sample 
 Logit Models OLS Regressions Logit Models OLS Regressions 
Dep. Var. Business Bank Loan 
Business Loan Total Debt Total Business 
Debt 
Business 
Bank Loan 
Business 
Loan 
Total Debt Total Business 
Debt 
Incentive Plan 
0.651*** 
(3.090) 
0.661*** 
(3.550) 
0.237** 
(2.380) 
0.263*** 
(2.670) 
0.624*** 
(2.740) 
0.644*** 
(3.190) 
0.247** 
(2.160) 
0.274** 
(2.420) 
HR  
0.020 
(0.050) 
0.264 
(0.790) 
0.085 
(0.520) 
-0.096 
(-0.590) 
0.102 
(0.260) 
0.330 
(0.950) 
0.196 
(1.060) 
-0.028 
(-0.150) 
Sales 
-0.100 
(-0.250) 
-0.139 
(-0.380) 
-0.177 
(-1.000) 
-0.071 
(-0.410) 
-0.045 
(-0.110) 
-0.113 
(-0.290) 
-0.256 
(-1.260) 
-0.130 
(-0.650) 
R&D 
-0.297 
(-0.720) 
-0.187 
(-0.500) 
0.012 
(0.070) 
-0.172 
(-0.970) 
-0.232 
(-0.550) 
-0.189 
(-0.480) 
0.042 
(0.210) 
-0.152 
(-0.770) 
Finance  
-0.007 
(-0.020) 
-0.042 
(-0.110) 
-0.220 
(-1.150) 
-0.051 
(-0.270) 
-0.018 
(-0.040) 
0.014 
(0.030) 
-0.253 
(-1.180) 
-0.089 
(-0.420) 
Total Assets  
0.109** 
(2.310) 
0.116*** 
(2.590) 
0.180*** 
(8.870) 
0.119*** 
(5.920) 
0.097* 
(1.930) 
0.099** 
(2.060) 
0.181*** 
(7.770) 
0.115*** 
(4.970) 
Sole Owner 
-0.742 
(-0.880) 
-0.168 
(-0.240) 
-0.063 
(-0.170) 
-0.405 
(-1.080) 
Dropped 
Corporation  
-1.096 
(-1.600) 
-0.637 
(-1.100) 
-0.291 
(-0.860) 
-0.107 
(-0.320) 
-1.270 
(-1.640) 
-0.668 
(-1.040) 
0.011 
(0.030) 
0.210 
(0.540) 
Partnership 
-0.992 
(-0.900) 
-1.230 
(-1.390) 
-0.460 
(-0.920) 
-0.404 
(-0.820) 
-1.501 
(-1.180) 
-1.141 
(-1.180) 
-0.339 
(-0.560) 
0.074 
(0.120) 
Work Exp 
0.072* 
(1.790) 
0.059 
(1.590) 
-0.023 
(-1.220) 
0.017 
(0.910) 
0.059 
(1.290) 
0.046 
(1.090) 
-0.022 
(-1.070) 
0.016 
(0.760) 
High School 
-1.361 
(-0.950) 
-2.313* 
(-1.890) 
-0.638 
(-1.070) 
-1.122* 
(-1.910) 
-0.694 
(-0.430) 
-1.753 
(-1.250) 
0.152 
(0.190) 
-0.313 
(-0.390) 
Post Secondary 
-0.664 
(-0.510) 
-1.563 
(-1.350) 
-0.331 
(-0.570) 
-0.551 
(-0.970) 
0.220 
(0.150) 
-0.810 
(-0.640) 
0.490 
(0.630) 
0.326 
(0.420) 
Post Graduate 
-0.052 
(-0.040) 
-0.736 
(-0.620) 
-0.140 
(-0.230) 
-0.260 
(-0.440) 
0.931 
(0.610) 
0.063 
(0.050) 
0.667 
(0.830) 
0.627 
(0.780) 
Minority 
0.588 
(0.560) 
-0.430 
(-0.540) 
-0.897* 
(-1.700) 
-1.120** 
(-2.140) 
1.001 
(0.820) 
-0.234 
(-0.280) 
-0.615 
(-1.050) 
-0.850 
(-1.470) 
Male 
0.196 
(0.250) 
0.196 
(0.300) 
-0.099 
(-0.320) 
-0.163 
(-0.540) 
0.177 
(0.230) 
0.232 
(0.360) 
-0.193 
(-0.560) 
-0.086 
(-0.250) 
Age Owner  
-0.620** 
(-2.190) 
-0.447* 
(-1.930) 
-0.104 
(-0.790) 
-0.161 
(-1.230) 
-0.714** 
(-2.300) 
-0.502** 
(-2.060) 
-0.191 
(-1.340) 
-0.229 
(-1.630) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  --- --- 3.560*** 
(4.290) 
2.143*** 
(2.610) 
--- --- 3.036*** 
(2.980) 
1.245 
(1.230) 
N 1236 1513 9055 9047 1096 1329 7145 7139 
F-value   5.000*** 3.320***   4.330*** 2.670*** 
LR value 35.860** 39.710**   32.530* 33.120*   
Fixed / Random  Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed 
Level of significance: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1 
